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Commercial bank management has become an increasingly chal-
lenging task in the 1980's. The banking environment has changed
to make the process more complex and more risky. The contribut-
ing factors include macroeconomic factors, deregulation, and for
Kansas bankers, a strained farm economy. As the banking environ-
ment has become more complex, some managers see the situation as
a threat to their banks' survival; others, however, may view the
changing environment as an occasion when good management will
truly be rewarded. In any event, the more complex environment
has changed the riskiness of banking, and management is being
challenged to adapt to this situation or get out of the business.
An important set of factors affecting the banking environ-
ment come under the heading of "macroeconomic variables." The
behavior of interest rates, in particular, changed from stability
to relative instability, especial ly during the early 1 9 80's. The
resulting effects on banks' cost of money spurred the development
and adoption of interest rate sensitivity measures and management
techniques. The prosperity, and thus banking activity, of both
borrowers and depositors are also affected by other macro factors
such as inflation, exchange rates, unemployment, and the general
health of the economy.
Naturally, bank clientele's prosperity (or lack thereof) is
reflected in the succes sf ulnes s of the bank. Bank management has
thus been acting to develop methods to deal with changes in their
business caused by the influence of macroeconomic factors on
creditors, depositors, and other sectors of the bank.
Another set of factors contributing to the changing banking
environment is the deregulatory changes that have taken place
over the last several years. Regulation Q, which governed
interest # rate ceilings on banking deposits, has been phased out.
This has resulted in greater competition for investors' funds at
a greater cost to banks. The availability of new types of in-
vestment accounts and investors' sensitivity to these improved
investment opportunities have worked together to raise banks'
cost of funds and make it more responsive to fluctuations in the
national money market rates. This is a relatively new develop-
ment for Kansas banks, particularly for many rural banks in the
state. Greater competition for funds has developed between banks
themselves and also between banks and other types of depository
and investment institutions.
Deregulation has also changed the competitive environment in
Kansas through the change in banking structure laws. Bank hold-
ing companies may now own controlling interest in more than one
Kansas bank. Just how deregulation will affect the nature of
competition is a matter of debate among Kansas bankers; it is
probable, though, that some bank holding companies will grow
larger through the acquisition of other banks. Thus, through
changing costs, reduced insulation from national markets, and
increasing competition, deregulation has changed the banking
environment and altered the risks faced by bank management.
A third major factor in the changing banking environment for
Kansas bankers is the stressed farm economy. Because so many
Kansas banks are agriculturally oriented, the agricultural reces-
sion is of some concern. The financial stress faced by farmers
has translated into financial stress for agricultural lenders all
across the United States. The depressed farming conditions of
the 198 O's represent a drastic change from the conditions of the
1970's, when optimism about higher commodity prices, expanding
exports, and rising land prices fueled expansions in many farming
operations. As each of these conditions turned around in the
1980's -- commodity prices are generally lower, export demand has
shrunk, and land prices have fallen —- farmers have been strained
to adjust. Banks have borne some of the brunt of the adjustment,
too, as many farms have folded, leaving the banks to salvage what
they can.
The conclusions to be drawn from these considerations are
that banking has become more risky and bank management has become
more complicated. Quality of many rural banks' loan portfolios
is down, banks' cost of funds is generally higher and more vola-
tile, and greater competition exists. The greater incidence of
bank failure, both in Kansas and across the country, is even more
evidence for the claim that bank management is more risky today.
There are several types of risk faced by bankers, and there
seems to be higher levels of risk present today in a number of
those categories. The problems of identifying, measuring, and
responding to these risks are problems bankers have always faced,
but the answers today are perhaps more challenging than ever.
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
The basic objective is to study Kansas bankers' management
of risks inherent in their industry. This object ive can be
subdivided into the problems of identifying, measuring, and re-
sponding to risks.
More specifically, one objective is to determine which risks
bankers perceive as most influential to the success of their
operations. Identifying the source of a problem or risk is an
important first step in dealing with that problem, so it is
valuable to see which risks bankers perceive as being their
biggest problems.
A related question deals with the reasons why bankers con-
sider certain risks more important than others. Not only should
the relative importance of the different risks be weighed, but
the reasons for these rankings should also be considered.
A second specific objective is to examine how bankers
measure or monitor the risks they face. This is closely related
to, and in some ways a part of, the identification process since
it involves identifying the level of each type of risk. Once
problems have been identified, these risks must be monitored to
determine how they are affecting bank operations and how well
risk treatment techniques are working.
The third specific objective is to examine how bankers
respond to risks once they have identified them and determined
that action is necessary. Each step in the risk management
process is crucial, but this step may be the most crucial. Be-
cause many Kansas bankers are agricultural banks, and since the
agricultural economy is so troubled at this time, a special aim
of this study is to examine risk responses dealing with the
agricultural lending function.
A final objective is to examine differences in the perform-
ance and practices of different groups of banks. Comparisons are
made among banks according to differences in size, location,
clientele, management experience, and overall CAMEL rating.
All the stages of risk management are thus examined to meet
the general objective of determining how well risk management
works. Each area of risk management -- identification, measure-
ment, and treatment — will also be examined to identify any
changes occurring over the last five years, changes which may
have been warranted because of the changing banking environment.
JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY
The changing banking environment has made bank management
more challenging in the 19 80's. Therefore, a study of past and
present risk management techniques seems warranted in order to
provide bankers with valuable information for future management.
More specifically, this study should accomplish several val-
uable tasks. First, it should lead to improved recognition of
the different types of risk and point out which ones are most im-
portant. Second, it should identify preferences for measures of
risk and determine which risks are most difficult to measure.
Third, the study will detail bankers' responses to risk -- which
responses are used, and which are most popular. Fourth, this
study will examine how risk identification, measurement, and
treatment have changed over time to see how risk management has
changed in this period. Finally, comparisons of more sucessful
and less successful banks are made in order to detect differences
in- risk management which may contribute to a bank's success.
This information should be useful to bankers seeking ways to
improve their operations.
OUTLINE OF STUDY
This report provides both a theoretical discussion of risk
in banking and a review of risk management techniques currently
used. The methodology of the study is discussed, and the results
of the study are reviewed. Finally, conclusions on the nature of
risk management in Kansas banking are stated.
The theoretical discussion first presents an explanation of
the general role of a financial intermediary in our economy.
Against this background, the types and sources of banking risk
are discussed, with details on each specific risk and the inter-
relationships between the different types of risk. These theo-
retical developments are also placed in the context of the cur-
rent economic and regulatory conditions to point out the risks
facing Kansas bankers today.
The second part of the theoretical discussion deals with
both the measurement and treatment of banking risks. Measurement
of each type of risk is discussed. Similarly, the responses to
each type of risk are reviewed, with explanations of how each
response deals with risky situations in the bank. The
interactions of various risk management techniques are also out-
lined. Final ly, risk management's interact ion with other bank
management goals is considered.
The empirical analysis includes a discussion of both the
methodology used and the results of the survey. The methodology
review considers the survey design, the population sampled, and
the various types of analyses conducted. The survey results for
all banks are presented, followed by the results of comparisons
made among particular groups of banks and bankers.
The report concludes with a summary of the results of the
study. Conclusions on Kansas bankers' risk management behavior
are stated. These conclusions have implications for a number of
different groups. One groups is Kansas bankers, as they strive
to manage risk in their operations. The other groups are farm-
ers, other bus ine sspeople , and depositors in general, since their
relationships with their banks could change as the banks adjust
their risk management practices.
CHAPTER TWO
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, BANKING RISK,
AND THE CURRENT BANKING ENVIRONMENT
INTRODUCTION
Financial intermediation is a crucial part of a well-devel-
oped capitalistic economy like that of the United States. The
transfer of capital accomplished by financial intermediaries
makes both savings and investment more attractive and can be done
for a profit for bank owners, too. Just like other business
enterprises, financial intermediaries face certain risks. The
risks come from the nature of the business where savers, borrow-
ers, bank owners, and regulators all require that their needs be
met simultaneously in ever-changing economic and regulatory en-
vironments. Intermediary management is complex as different
goals and risks must be weighed against each other. However, a
well-functioning financial intermediation process is necessary
for our economy to function efficiently.
This chapter first reviews the role of a financial inter-
mediary in our economy. Consideration of the economic role of
financial intermediaries in general, and commercial banks in par-
ticular, fosters understanding for a discussion of the risks of
the banking business. Both the types and sources of banking risk
are reviewed. Finally, risk is considered in the light of
current economic and regulatory conditions to provide a better
8
understanding of risk in the current banking environment.
THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION PROCESS
In simplest terms, the financial intermediation process has
as its goal the satisfaction of the diverse desires of both the
ultimate borrower and the ultimate lender in our economy. The
efficient transfer of capital from savers to borrowers provides
the means for economic growth and meets the needs of both borrow-
ers and savers. Intermediaries compete to provide their services
for the least cost and greatest profit for themselves. Regula-
tors oversee the process to prevent abuses and incompetence from
undermining the financial system. Thus, participants include
savers, borrowers, intermediaries, and regulators, each with
their own goals.
Financial intermediation has been defined as the process
where "the financial sector collects savings from savers, or
surplus spending units, and directs the funds to borrowers, or
deficit spending units. "* The more efficiently this transfer is
accomplished, the larger the flow of capital, the greater the
accommodation of borrower and saver preferences, and the greater
the overall gain to the entire economy. Financial intermediaries
bridge the gap between borrowers and savers when the two parties'
preferences on financial claims differ with regard to size,
maturity, legal character, marketability, divisibility, liquid-
ity, redeemabi lity , and risk. 2 Intermediaries thus create two
markets where only one would exist otherwise; that is, a single
market where ultimate savers and borrowers interact is replaced
by one market whose players are savers and intermediaries and
another market whose participants are borrowers and intermediar-
ies. All parties — savers, borrowers, and intermediaries --
benefit from this arrangement, and the economy as a whole bene-
fits, as well.
The intermediaries perform several types of intermediation
services which are the bases for their existence. A list of
these services include:
1) denomination (size) intermediation;
2) maturity intermediation;
3) default and price risk intermediation;
4) interest rate intermediation; and
5) information int ermed iat ion .
3
Denomination and maturity intermediation services are easy to
understand -- savers and borrowers seldom have similar prefer-
ences in these areas. Default risk and price risk intermediation
allocate capital from very risk-averse savers to borrowers tak-
ing calculated risks, all at prices that are mutually beneficial
and economically efficient. Interest rate intermediation pro-
tects savers and borrowers from some undesirable effects of
interest rate fluctuation. Information intermediation spares
savers the effort of investigating potential borrowers' credit-
worthiness.
The services performed by intermediaries are also the
sources of their potential profits. Each form of intermediation
involves some type of risk or effort that requires a compensat-
ing return if it is to be performed. Intermediaries are able to
assume these risks and still make profits by spreading their
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costs and risks over large pools of resources that behave in a
fairly predictable way. This specialization also improves the
effectiveness of capital allocation in a risk-return framework.
The aims of the financial intermediation process include effi-
cient allocation of resources for the economy, reduced costs to
borrowers, greater returns and safety for savers, and profits for
the entrepreneurial intermediary.
A commercial bank is one of the several types of financial
intermediaries common in the United States. The distinctions be-
tween commercial banks and other intermediaries are becoming
fewer and fewer over time as deregulation changes the financial
sector. A bank is legally defined in Section 2 of the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act as
"any institution organized under the laws of the
United States, [and] and State of the United States
. . .
which (1) accepts deposits that the depositor
has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) en-
gages in the business of making commercial loans."*
Commercial banks are characteristically funded through both de-
mand and time deposits, and they typically invest these funds in
loans and certain types of securities. Commercial banks operate
with the intention of making profits for the owners. Management
has the task of maximizing owner wealth within the framework of
constraints set up by regulators, competitors, and others.
Other types of intermediaries include savings and loans,
credit unions, finance companies, and insurance companies. An-
other noteworthy intermediary for agriculture is the Farm Credit
System. Some of these intermediaries collect funds in a very
different fashion than do commercial banks, but all are
11
performing some of the basic intermediation services.
An important force in the banking process is the regulators.
Since resources of so many people are held by banks, regulators
work to ensure that banks are using sound operating practices.
The regulators have the important job of preventing abuses or
incompetence from undermining the system, thus maintaining the
public's confidence. There are often differences of opinion
between bankers and regulators as to how much supervision and
regulation are necessary. The record seems to indicate that
current regulatory practices protect the public interest while
allowing banks to operate as profit-oriented businesses. Chan-
nels exist, however, for bankers and regulators to continue to
change the system as necessary to accomplish both of these goals.
TYPES AND SOURCES OF BANKING RISKS
It is necessary for banks to assume certain risks as they
perform their intermediary services. The risks considered in
this study are:
a) credit risk: the risk of potential delinquency or
default on loans and securities;
b) investment risk: the risk of capital losses on the
sale of securities before maturity;
c) liquidity risk: the risk of inadequate funding
source s ;
d) cost of funds risk: the risk of unfavorable changes
in the bank's cost of funds;
e) solvency risk: the risk of insolvency, especially due
to the bank's high financial leverage; and
12
f) regulatory risk: the risk resulting from changes in
the regulatory environment.
An in-depth examination of each type of risk is necessary to
fully understand how it arises and how it should be measured and
managed
.
Credit risk. Credit risk is the risk that repayment of
interest and principal will be delinquent or in default. This
is perhaps the most obvious type of risk in banking since banks'
lending activities are their primary sources of income and often
their primary source of problems. Nonpayment creates obvious
problems for the bank.
Nonpayment is a direct business loss; both the principal
loaned and the interest accrued are lost. Loan losses are writ-
ten off against the bank's capital, thus reducing the owners'
equity in the bank and increasing the chance of bank insolvency.
Some recovery may be made through foreclosure or other reposses-
sion measures, but these are costly in terms of officer time,
legal costs, and public image. Even delinquency is costly, since
it impedes normal operation of the bank by requiring officer time
for collection procedures, by disrupting the normal flow of funds
through the bank, and by moving loans toward default standing and
capital write-down.
Bankers face the same risk-return trade-off confronting all
other types of investors as they make their investment decisions.
Regulators also have certain standards regarding risk that they
impose order to maintain some safety in the system. Bankers are
penalized for assuming too much credit risk through capital
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write-down that results from loan losses.
Credit risk may come from three di fferent . areas in the bank:
the loan portfolio, the securities portfolio, and interbank
lending activities. Each area differs in how it fits into the
entire bank's operation, and the degree of credit risk exposure
also differs in each area.
The loan portfolio is the greatest source of credit risk in
the bank. A bank's lending activity is its primary source of in-
come, and some degree of risk is assumed in order to achieve an
acceptable level of income. The bank's lending activity incor-
porates the performance of the intermediary services mentioned
before (i.e., denomination intermediation, maturity intermedia-
tion, default risk intermediation, etc.), all of which involve
some degree of risk. Also, different types of loans have varying
degrees of riskiness. Installment and commercial loans, for
example, typically have higher rates of default than real estate
loans. ^ Making different types of loans is a form of diversifi-
cation in that the portfolio includes a large pool of assets
which hopefully will not deteriorate simultaneously.
The securities portfolio is the second source of credit risk
in the bank. Compared to their loans, most securities owned by
banks are not nearly as prone to default. The purpose of the
securities portfolio is to provide liquidity and assets for
pledging, rather than provide a major source of income as do
loans, so it is logical that this portfolio would be exposed to
less credit risk. Regulations also limit investment to certain
types of securities to ensure that unnecessary risks are not
taken. Still, the risk of nonpayment is a relevant consideration
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for most of a bank's debt securities. Losses from nonpayment of
these investments is relatively uncommon.
The third area providing credit risk is its interbank lend-
ing activities. More specifically, these sources of risk are:
1) "due from" account balances maintained in excess of the
FDIC-insured $100,000 level;
2) the Fed Funds Sold position;
3) money market investments with other banks, such as the
partially uninsured negotiable CDs and unsecured
bankers' acceptances;
4) operational services provided by other banks, such as
collections for correspondent loans and wire transfer
t ransac t ions
;
5) contingent credit risks, such as acceptance of standby
letters of credit; and
6) "downstream" correspondent participation loans.
6
There are very different levels of credit risk exposure just
within this group of activities. For example, the Fed Funds Sold
position would be much less risky than the correspondent partici-
pation loan situation. The contingent risks are very difficult
to quantify, too, which makes a comparison to the other categor-
ies difficult. As a whole, however, this entire group of activi-
ties is less risky than the bank's customer lending activities.
Explicit risk measurement and management techniques for these
activities are still being developed.
Inves tment risk. Investment risk, the risk of realizing
capital losses on the sale of securities, is one of the risks
banks experience in the face of changing interest rates. The
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value of a fixed coupon bond falls when interest rates rise;
therefore, the value of a bank's securities portfolio falls as
interest rates rise. This unexpected rise in interest rates thus
reduces the bank's net worth.
Losses on securities are not realized, though, until they
are actually sold. Thus, circumstances requiring the liquidation
of these assets are important to investment risk exposure. The
decline in bond value before sale can also be important to a bank
whose stock is actively traded, since the bank's net worth (and
thus its stock price) will decline as the value of its security
portfolio dec lines. Thus, while the bank's expo sure to invest-
ment riBk depends in part on the volatility of interest rates, it
also depends on the nature of the bank's ownership.
Because circumstances requiring the liquidation of devalued
securities is important, investment risk has a close relationship
with liquidity risk. If devalued securities need not be sold,
they may mature and the proceeds reinvested at higher rates with
no loss realized. Sale of securities would be caused by cash
demand (e.g., withdrawal demand and loan demand), so management
of the bank's liquidity position is important to its investment
risk exposure.
Liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is the risk that a bank will
experience a loss of funding sources and be unable to meet demand
for funds. Again, there exists a linkage with investment risk
since the sale of securities for liquidity pur poses can create
capital losses. A bank's liquidity needs come primarily from
withdrawal demand, which would have the greatest priority, and
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from loan demand, which is important for the realization of good
investment opportunities. Factors which affect deposits, with-
drawals, and lending thus affect the bank's exposure to liquidity
risk .
Cash and unpledged marketable securities represent only a
fraction of a bank's total assets, but this fraction is used to
provide a liquidity reserve. Bank management desires to minimize
the amount held in these low or nonearning assets while still
maintaining an adequate reserve. Thus, the less volatile the
cash flow patterns, the smaller the reserve may be to still
remain adequate. The predictability of the cash flows is also
important, since predictable cash flow patterns also permit
smaller reserve levels. Banks holding large volatile deposits
like negotiable certificates of deposit (CD's) may have greater
liquidity risk exposure.
Marketability of securities and the bank's pledging require-
ments are further considerations in determining liquidity risk
exposure. Because banks hold some securities which may not be
readily marketable, such as some state or local bonds, attention
to composition of the securities portfolio is necessary. Securi-
ties pledged against secured deposits are also ineligible for
sale to meet liquidity needs.
Cos t of funds risk. Cost of funds risk is the risk of fac-
ing unanticipated changes in the cost of funds as interest rates
change. Expressed another way, it is "the risk of loss of net
interest income [resulting] from movements in borrowing and
lending rates not being perfectly synchronized."" Perhaps the
most obvious example of this would be an occassion when lending
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rates could not respond quickly enough to maintain the bank's
interest margin when savings rates were rising. A less obvious
situation of cost to the bank would be one where lending rates
were declining while relatively longer- termed liabilities kept
interest costs high, again reducing the interest margin. Thus,
cost of funds risk exposure is based on the volatility of inter-
est rates and the maturity structure of both assets and liabili-
ties.
Maturities are important because they determine the speed
with which banks can respond to changes in interest rates. The
relative maturities of rate-sensitive assets (RSA's) and rate-
sensitive liabilities (RSL's) determine the behavior of the in-
terest margin when interest rates change. When interest rates
rise, the interest margin widens when RSA maturities are shorter
than RSL maturities, since RSA rates climb more quickly. The
interest margin narrows when RSA maturities are longer than those
of RSL's during periods of rising rates. When interest rates
fall, these conditions are all reversed. In considering the
question of maturities and cost of funds risk, two related con-
cerns are the speed at which rates can be adjusted on variable
rate loans and the overall importance of variable rate loans in
the loan portfolio. Both of these factors can affect the inter-
est rate sensitivity of a bank's assets.
Solvency risk. Solvency risk is the risk that the bank may
become insolvent. That is, solvency risk is the risk that the
bank's capital becomes inadequate as its asset values decline
relative to the value of claims against the bank.
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Insolvency is what ultimately closes a bank, but insolvency
itself is the result of many problems from throughout the bank.
In particular, loan losses produce insolvency because they reduce
the bank's net worth through write-down of capital. Thus, credit
risk is a key component in determining solvency risk exposure.
Other problem situations in the bank which result in lower income
through lower revenues, higher costs, or both, also contribute to
solvency risk exposure in that they prevent internal earnings
from supplying potentially crucial capital. Therefore, risk-
taking in all bank operations is ultimately reflected in sol-
vency risk exposure.
Regulatory risk. Regulatory risk is the risk of unfavorable
effects resulting from changes in the regulatory environment.
Examples of regulatory changes influencing banking operations
are the effects on cost of funds produced by the phase-out of
interest rate ceilings, and the effects on the nature of com-
petition caused by changes in banking structure regulations.
Regulatory risk is perhaps the most difficult risk to quantify,
as there are no financial ratios or indices with which to measure
this risk. It is apparent, though, that some regulatory changes
have brought about changes in banking operations and perform-
ance .°
The changing regulatory environment of the 1980's has pro-
duced the most changes in banking since the reforms instituted in
the 1930'8. Operations within banks have changed as interest rate
ceilings have disappeared, new types of accounts have become
available, and new types of services have been instituted. Com-
petition between banks and other types of financial institutions
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has become more intense as geographical restrictions have been
eased and distinctions between types of financial institutions
have become less marked. Again, effects of regulatory changes
are very difficult to quantify and vary from bank to bank, but
they do influence bank operations and performance.
Interrelationships between risks. It is apparent that there
are many relationships between the different risks. It is also
apparent that overall bank performance is the result of many
interactions taking place between these different factors in the
bank. Therefore, no evaluation of one type of risk exposure and
treatment should be made without at least some consideration of
how this treatment would influence other types of risk exposure.
A number of interrelationships have been mentioned, and
several others exist. One very important relationship is the one
between credit risk and solvency risk; the assumption of more
credit risk increases the likelihood of loan losses which expose
the bank to a greater risk of insolvency. The relationship
between investment risk and liquidity risk considers that the
exposure to capital losses on securities may be heightened by a
lack of liquid reserves in the bank. Another relationship exists
between cost of funds risk and credit risk; with variable rate
loans the bank can pass on its cost of funds risk to the borrower
but this in turn increases bank credit risk exposure as the
borrower now must deal with the uncertainties associated with
cost of funds risk. Obviously, these interrelationships must be
considered in the management of banking risk, since the treatment
of one problem may create another one.
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RISK AND THE BANKING ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1980'S
It is necessary to consider banking risks in the context of
the current banking environment. Only by considering these un-
certainties in the framework of current conditions can practical
application be made.
There are both regulatory and economic factors which have
changed the nature of banking in the 1980's. These factors have
made banking more complex and more competitive. The decade of
the 1980's has been a time of great change and innovation in
banking and the financial sector as a whole. New sources of risk
exposure have been created as the banking environment has
changed
.
One important factor in the changing banking environment is
the changing regulatory setting in which banks and other finan-
cial institutions operate. These changes in the regulatory envi-
ronment have introduced regulatory risk in that these new rules
have created conditions where further unfavorable effects are
pos s ible
.
The greatest regulatory changes of the 1980's came in 1980,
when the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act (DIDMCA) became law. This law incorporated changes dis-
cussed for years by experts. Changes were deemed necessary be-
cause of existing rules "made obsolete by changes in the economy,
the functioning of credit markets, technology, consumer demands
for financial services, and the competitive environment."^ The
aims of the DIDMCA were to:
1) improve regulatory controls over the money supply and to
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equalize the cost of doing this for all depository
institutions ;
2) remove the impediments to competition for funds among
depository institutions and allow small savers to achieve
a market rate of return; and
3) expand the availability of financial services to the pub-
lic and reduce the competitive inequalities between
financial institutions offering them.
Measures taken to implement these goals included the imposition
of uniform reserve requirements at all depository institutions,
the phase-out of interest rate ceilings, authorization of nego-
tiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts and other interest-
bearing transaction accounts at both banks and savings and loans,
and the broadening of savings and loans' powers and activities.
These steps brought relatively major changes to the U.S. finan-
cial sector.
Implementation of these changes had several direct effects
on banking operations and performance. One direct effect of the
phase-out of interest rate ceilings, coupled with the prol itera-
tion of new interest-bearing deposits, was to raise banks' cost
of funds as previously nonearning demand deposits and passbook
savings moved into higher-earning accounts. 12 More competition
was spawned among banks and other institutions for these deposits
as interest rate ceilings were lifted. The greater competition
among banks, savings and lo an s , and even other entities such as
nonbank banks and investment banking firms has put greater stress
on some banks in their pursuit of profit with safe operation.
Other regulatory changes have influenced bank performance in
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this period, too. In particular, banking structure laws have
been moving the industry toward an environment of greater compe-
tition. Limited interstate and regional banking conditions exist
and will probably be broader in the future. In Kansas, multibank
holding companies were authorized in 1985 and represented a major
change in this state's banking structure policy. The long term
effects of these regulatory changes are subject to debate, but
the effect of broadening the competitive financial market seems
to be one of the results.
Other important factors influencing bank operations and
performance could be classified as economic factors. Examples of
these factors are inflation, fluctuating interest rates, and the
state of both the economy in general and certain sectors of the
economy in particular. The changing economic conditions of the
1980's seem to have altered the extent of banks' risk exposure.
Some bank operations have become more complex and performance has
sometimes suffered while adjustments were being made to deal with
new conditions.
One example of changing conditions' influence on banks in
this period is seen in the conditions of interest rate volatility
in the early 1980's. This time period saw interest rates climb
to record levels, fall back to near-normal rates, and then climb
to new record heights. This process increased cost of funds
risk, as cost of funds rose and fell with market rates. Invest-
ment risk would have been a greater hazard to banks with actively
traded stock and to all banks forced to sell devalued securities.
Credit risk crept into the picture when borrowers could obtain
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loans only at much higher interest rates. These risks spurred
the adoption of new risk management techniques like gap manage-
ment, hedging cost of funds risk with financial futures con-
tracts, and the increased use of variable rate loans. Interest
rates have become more stable in the mid-1980's, but the effects
of interest rate volatility remain visible through the continued
use of these new risk management techniques.
The health of a specific sector of the economy, namely agri-
culture, has had visible effects on banking performance in the
United States in the 1980's. 13 Since 1981, farm income has
declined, leaving many farmers in poor financial condition. This
situation has produced credit risk and solvency risk exposure as
loan losses and delinquencies have mounted. Agricultural banks
now represent a disproportionately large share of regulators'
"problem" banks. 14 A recent nationwide survey indicates that
many bankers see the farm recession as being a long-term problem,
so this trend of deterioration may well continue.
In summary, the banking environment has experienced major
changes, as regulatory and economic factors have worked to create
a more complex, more competitive banking setting. This new and
changing environment has produced greater risk exposure for some
banks. As a result, new risk management techniques are being
adopted to deal with the new conditions.
SUMMARY
Commercial banks perform the very important job of providing
the financial intermediation services necessary for our economy
to function. Ultimate borrowers' and savers' needs are met while
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banks typically earn a profit for the services they provide. One
of these services is the assumption of risk in the intermediation
process. Banking risk can be broken down into several categories
according to the nature of risk presented to the bank (e.g.,
credit risk, liquidity risk, and solvency risk). Many complex
interrelationships exist between these different risks, several
of which may be present in any one situation.
The environment which gives rise to these risks is an ever-
changing one. Important changes in the regulatory and economic
environments have altered banking conditions in the last several
years. The "textbook" discussion of banking risks must be ap-
plied to current banking conditions to best understand and appre-
ciate the nature of risk management in banking today. When this
application is made, it becomes apparent that risk management is
growing in complexity and difficulty.
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CHAPTER THREE
RISK MEASUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT
INTRODUCTION
There is a continuous feedback process of evaluating risk
exposure and then acting to treat that exposure. Risk measurement
and management in banking includes both commmon practices which
should be a normal part of a bank's daily operations, and special
practices which are implemented at the senior management level.
Risk management needs and capabilities vary among banks and
bankers. Bank size, location, clientele, and management respon-
sibility and training are all factors which influence the degree
and type of bank risk exposure, as well as the banker's ability
to manage these risks. Needs for sophistication and specializa-
tion in risk management obviously vary among banks. Furthermore,
a high degree of sophistication is not necessarily a prerequisite
for, nor a guarantee of successful risk management.
This chapter provides a discussion of current risk measure-
ment and management techniques. Emphasis is given to the special
practices implemented by senior management, while more limited
attention is given to daily practices and principles of risk
management that are observed in daily operations. For each type
of risk, a brief review of its sources will be followed by
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discussions of both its measurement and management. This is
followed by a discussion of the many relationships between the
risks and the importance of risk management that integrates all
risk responses. The final section of the chapter reviews types
and sources of risk management literature and mentions concepts
from other research which were incorporated into this study.
CREDIT RISK
Credit risk is the risk that borrowers will be delinquent or
in default in their repayment of interest and principal. The
loan portfolio produces the greatest credit risk exposure, and
most credit risk management activities involve the loan portfo-
lio. Therefore, the focus of this section is on the management
of the loan portfolio, with relatively less attention given to
the management of the other types of lending.
Credit risk can be viewed from both "micro" and "macro
standpoints. The micro standpoint considers the characteristics
of individual loans and loan applications in order to determine
the likelihood of repayment. The macro view of credit risk con-
siders entire categories of loans and the loan portfolio as a
whole in order to determine the effectiveness of current credit
policies and to evaluate and address the problems that potential
and actual loan losses may create. Management on the micro level
is a daily part of every loan officer's job, while management on
the macro level is just one of senior management's responsibili-
ties. Micro and macro activities influence each other (e.g., bad
loans go from a micro level problem to a macro level problem as
they affect the bank's solvency), so micro-macro coordination is
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necessary.
Measurement. One type of measure bankers use to determine
credit risk exposure is loan delinquencies. A rising level of
loan delinquencies vould naturally indicate a worsening in the
quality of the loan portfolio. Delinquent loans may be classi-
fied into different categories, according to length of delinquen-
cy. "Thirty days" and "ninety days" are two common classifica-
tions, with the longer delinquency being more threatening. Some
examination may be necessary to determine whether delinquencies
are isolated individual cases or whether these problems indicate
a larger threat of worsening credit conditions or inadequate loan
policies and procedures. Recent studies show that the level of
farm loan delinquencies has been rising in recent years.
A second indicator of credit risk which banks use is the
level of loan losses. Loan losses are also an indicator of the
nature of business conditions and the adequacy of lending poli-
cies and procedures. Like delinquencies, loan losses may be
rooted in individual borrowers' problems or may be indicators of
problems on a larger scale.
Specific measures of loan losses include the dollar volume
of loan losses and the loan losses as a percentage of all loans.
The dollar volume figure measures the absolute level of losses
and may be compared to the bank's capital account to determine
its adequacy. The ratio of loan losses to total loans is an
indicator of the relative size of loan losses; as the ratio
increases, the seriousness of the problem increases. A ratio
relatively high in comparison to those of peers might be an
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indicator of poor lending practices within that bank, while a
historically high ratio for all banks would be more indicative of
a worsening of credit conditions in general. Nationwide, loan
losses as a percentage of total assets have generally increased
through the early 1980's. 2
When examiners measure a bank's credit risk exposure, they
necessarily begin with an evaluation of the bank's lending poli-
cies and its administration of the entire loan portfolio. How-
ever, their appraisal eventually requires evaluation of individ-
ual loans. Loans are "scheduled" if they lack legal or technical
documentary support or if they represent a concentration of
credit in one potentially vulnerable industry.
"Scheduled loans are classified if they present more
immediate risk of nonpayment. Adversely classified




loans are inadequately protected by
the net worth and paying capacity of the borrower, or
the pledged collateral. The bank will likely sustain
some loss if deficiencies are not corrected;
2) doubt f u 1 loans have all the weaknesses of sub-
standard loans but have deteriorated such that they
have a high probability of substantial loss;
3
)
loss loans are considered un collectible and of little
or no value as a bank asset . "3
The bank's capital account is reduced by the uncollectible por-
tion of these classified loans. Therefore, all loss loans are
charged off and some portion of the doubtful loans is also
charged off. This is why credit risk exposure is an important
component in determining solvency risk exposure. Historically,
examiners have been adept at detect ing problem loans, * although a
recent survey of Kansas bankers indicates that bankers feel
examiner performance could improve.
^
Forecasts of borrowers' business and economic conditions may
30
also be used to determine credit risk exposure inasmuch as they
determine borrowers' repayment capabilities. A prime example of
this for Kansas bankers in 1985 is the condition of the agricul-
tural economy and its effects on farm lending. Farm credit
conditions in 1985 are relatively poor and may not improve for
some time; one recent nationwide survey of bankers indicates that
they perceive the farm recession as a long-term problem. These
conditions alert bankers to credit risk exposure and signal to
them that special attention may be necessary in future management
of the agricultural loan portfolio.
On the "micro" level, measurement of the credit risk of in-
dividual loans and loan applications is accomplished by the loan
review process. Its main objective is to detect problem loans as
early as possible in order to effect whatever treatment possible
to prevent a loss from developing.
"Whatever means are used to conduct the review, the
following points should be reviewed:
1) financial condition and repayment ability of the
borrower
;
2) completeness of documentation;
3) consistency with loan policy;
4) perfection of security interest on collateral;
5) legal and regulatory compliance; and
6) apparent profitability."'
Of course, individual loan officers try to observe all of these
points when they make loans, but the loan review process provides
control and direction in the regular management of the loan
portfolio.
Measuring credit risk in the investment portfolio is rela-
tively simple in comparison to measuring risk in the loan
portfolio. The task is simpler because many of the securities held
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are either rated according to their quality by professional se-
curities graders (e.g., Moody's, Standard and Poor's) or else the
securities are issued by the U.S. Treasury or some other federal
agency, meaning that there is little chance of default. Security
ratings are good indicators of risk since an investigation of
each "borrower's" creditworthiness is incorporated into these
ratings. Regulatory restrict ions prevent commercial banks from
owning certain securities which have a greater degree of credit
risk, such as medium-quality corporate bonds. Certain municipal
bonds and other types of local obligations are the most risky
securities owned by a bank, but these securities are usual ly
backed by the taxing authority of some local governmental entity.
Interbank lending activities produce credit risk that can be
difficult to measure. There is great variation in credit risk
exposure within this broad classification of lending activities.
Risk of default on Fed Funds Sold, for example, is quite low, as
is the risk of loss in a wire transfer transaction; participation
loans with correspondent banks are riskier in comparison. Meas-
urement of credit risk in this and similar situations involve the
same principles used in evaluating individual notes in the loan
portfolio. Evaluation of other interbank lending activities,
like repurchase agreements and bankers' acceptances would require
knowledge of the soundness of the other bank's operations and
procedur es
.
Management. Management of credit risk is extensive on both
the micro and macro levels.
Daily credit risk management begins with the regular
application of established loan policies and procedures. These
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are guidelines for loan officers for their daily work, and they
also provide a standard for evaluation by the loan review commit-
tee. Daily credit risk management also entails the observance of
sound credit evaluation procedures.
"The essence of all credit analysis can be captured
in four basic credit factors or lines of inquiry:
1) the borrower's character;
2) the use of loan funds;
3) the primary source of loan repayment;
4) secondary sources of repayment .
"
e
Sound credit evaluation and observance of established policies
and procedures are credit risk management practices which must be
performed daily.
The loan review process regularly monitors the quality of
both loans and the loan-making process. It is a measurement tool
in that it provides feedback for both loan officers and senior
management, but it is a management tool in that it sorts out
loans that need special attention and treatment. Loans are
examined for their quality using the six factors mentioned ear-
lier. Most banks are unable to regularly review every loan, but
every loan with certain characteristics, such as sufficiently
large size or sufficiently questionable quality, should be re-
viewed .
Credit risk management at the macro level involves processes
that provide guidance for everyday credit risk management and
institute adjustments necessary in special situations. These
processes include the formulation and revision of loan policies
and procedures, plus decisions on the loan portfolio's diversifi-
cation, use of participation loans, guaranteed loan programs, and
other activities to preserve or improve the quality of the loan
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portfolio .
The formulation of a loan policy involves producing a writ-
ten statement of the bank's general objectives in managing its
loan portfolio and an outline of technical principles and pro-
cedures to be followed in managing the loan portfolio. This
should include a statement of specific procedures and parameters
to be observed for each type of loan in the portfolio. The
statement of the bank's lending objectives should include "state-
ments about its perceived business role in its trade area, per-
ceived market niche, profitability, maintenance of public confi-
dence, and degree of aggressiveness and competitiveness."" The
general outline of principles and procedures should include dis-
cussions of documentation standards, security interests, problem
loan collections, charge-off policy, regulatory compliance, loan
pricing, and the loan review process. For each type of loan, the
policy should state specific parameters and procedures which in-
clude the loan's description and purpose, the preferred maturity,
minimum and maximum amounts, security requirements, perfection of
collateral, pricing policy, insurance requirements, and any nec-
essary channels of approval. 10
As part of the risk measurement-management feedback process,
periodic revisions in the loan policy may be necessary. As
economic, regulatory, and competitive conditions change, both
general objectives and specific procedures may be modified. The
loan review process, bank examinations, expressions of stockhold-
ers' desires, and management's expectations are all sources of
input when considering policy changes.
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Diversification is one way that banks spread credit risk
over a large pool of assets. Since not every type of loan would
be expected to deteriorate at the same time, the bank is more
likely to have some quality loans whenever one certain class of
loans deteriorates in quality. The loan policy may even quantify
the percentage of the loan portfolio to be held in each loan
class (e.g., commercial, agricultural, installment, or any other
classification specified). Diversification may be instituted on
a geographical basis so that loan quality and profitability are
not subject to only the success of the local economy. The bank's
ability to diversify in these different ways is dependent upon
factors such as bank size, the nature of local market s, the
nature of competition, and other factors which would influence
its opportunity to lend to new customers.
Participation loans are made for several reasons; these
include lack of liquidity, slack loan demand, overline requests,
diversification, and risk sharing.* * Diversification via parti-
cipation can be accomplished through participation in types of
loans not usually made by the bank. Participation allows a bank
to profit from overline requests (individual loan requests which
are larger than the bank's legal lending limits). Credit risk
may be shared with other financial institutions via participation
loans. However, in these circumstances where the borrower's
financial condition is questionable, "the primary emphasis is
placed on the marketability of col lateral rather than earnings or
financial strength. Extremely close control over the collateral
is required." 1 ^ Thus, participation loans may be used to manage
credit risk as well as other risks.
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Loan guarantee programs are also used in credit risk man-
agement. Government agencies, like the Small Business Adminis-
tration and the Farmers Home Administration, guarantee repayment
of a specified percentage of the principal loaned. This limits
the bank's exposure to loss on these loans, which are typically
made to higher-risk borrowers. Guarantors may also be private
entities or individuals who guarantee payment if the primary
borrower does not repay. Documentation and investigation of the
guarantor's creditworthiness are very important in these cases.
Further macro management of credit risk involves overseeing
loan supervision activities, foreclosure proceedings, and work-
out procedures. Senior management may need to periodically
monitor and adjust these programs to make them as effective as
po ssib le .
In the management of the investment portfolio, credit risk
is a nominal factor. Other factors such as maturity and market-
ability of the securities are more important since the securities
portfolio is maintained as a center for liquidity, not profit-
ability. Simply observing regulatory restrictions takes the bank
away from most credit risk, and the use of prudent credit evalua-
tion principles, via ratings and other investigations, helps
banks avoid other securities having danger of delinquency or
default .
The final area of credit risk management is that of inter-
bank lending .
"Managing interbank credit risk involves these five steps:
1) establish a written interbank credit risk policy;
2) establish acceptable policy limits for the total
portfolio as well as for individual correspondents for
interbank credit exposure;
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3) conduct a credit analysis of the individual banks
with which there is a business relationship;
4) approve credit exposures to banks in compliance with
the written interbank credit risk policy; and .,
5) monitor the interbank credit risk management program."
Thus, the management of interbank credit risk is very similar to
the management of credit risk resulting from regular lending ac-
tivities. Establishment of a written interbank lending policy is
a rather new concept, but it and all the other concepts of inter-
bank credit risk management are basically restatements of general
credit risk treatments applied to a different type of borrower.
Summary . Credit risk receives more attention in bank man-
agement than any other type of risk. Measurement and management
must be done by both junior and senior officers, but sound daily
practices are perhaps more important in managing credit risk than
any other type of risk.
INVESTMENT RISK
Investment risk includes both the risk of capital loss on
the sale of securities and the risk of reduced bank net worth
resulting from reduced security value. The danger of capital
losses is probably the more immediate hazard to Kansas banks,
since the risk of reduced net worth is more important to banks
whose stock is actively traded, which is uncommon for the major-
ity of Kansas banks.
Measurement . Since interest rate movements are the cause of
securities' devaluation, consideration must be given to the vola-
tility of interest rates. Because liquidity needs often
necessitate the sale of devalued securities, anticipating liquid-
ity needs is important. The maturity of securities determines
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how long they are vulnerable to unexpected changes in interest
rates, with longer maturities presenting more danger. A measure
called duration gap may also be used to determine the bank's




Because rises in interest rates produce the devaluation of
securities which expose the bank to losses, the bank should find
it valuable to evaluate potential interest rate changes. Again,
it is important to remember that only unexpected changes in
interest rates cause problems.'' This raises the question of
bankers being able to "out-guess" the market; if bankers feel
they can do this on a regular basis, they may not only immunize
their banks against unfavorable rate changes but also position
themselves to profit from these changes. Their ability to do
this regularly is questionable.^* What bankers should consider
about interest rate changes is their volatility, since more
volatile interest rate changes produce greater potential for
losses. Interest rate volatility was much greater in the early
1980's than in 1985. More stable conditions have existed since
the Federal Reserve changed its method of managing interest rates
and the money supply in 1982, but banks should still be alert for
economic events which influence interest rates.
Awareness of the nature of the bank's liquidity needs is
also important in monitoring investment risk. The sale of de-
valued securities creates a realized capital loss for the bank.
The nature of the need determines whether selling securities is
the most appropriate response. The predictability and volatil-
ity of withdrawal and loan demands are important gauges of
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investment risk since they are major factors in determining the
bank's liquidity needs. The greater the availability of other
liquidity sources outside the investment portfolio, the less is
the investment risk exposure.
The maturity of securities in the investment portfolio is
another measure of investment risk exposure. Maturity determines
how much time is available for unexpected interest rate changes
to occur -- the longer the maturity, the greater the risk of an
unexpected rise in interest rates occurring before bond maturity.
There are several different ways to view the maturities of
securities when measuring investment risk. These methods of
evaluation include a basic gap model, more sophisticated gap
models with added "maturity buckets," and a number of duration
gap models. However, gap models also consider the maturities of
several other types of financial instruments held by the bank and
these models are used to control much more than investment risk.
Because the management of other risks involves the manipulation
of the investments' maturities, investment risk exposure may
sometimes be higher than desired; this risk exposure trade-off,
however, may be acceptable to management.
Management . Several decisions must be made before insti-
tuting specific steps for investment risk management. First, the
priority of investment risk relative to other risks must be
determined since management of the investment portfolio is an
important factor in the management of other types of risk, nota-
bly liquidity and cost of funds risks. The banker must also
decide whether risk of reduced net worth or risk of realized
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capital losses is more important; the nature of bank ownership is
an important factor in this decision. Finally, the banker must
decide whether to attempt to anticipate interest rate changes.
Once these decisions have been made, the bank may then institute
any number of investment risk management actions.
One option in investment risk management involves the man-
agement of the composition of the securities portfolio with
respect to maturities. Shorter maturities result in a shorter
time that the bank has investment s locked into a certain rate of
return. Also, a given rise in interest rates produces a smaller
devaluation for bonds that have shorter maturities. In periods
of volatile interest rates, as in the early 1980's, maintaining
very short maturities proved to be the best management strategy
since this minimized the effects produced by a rise in interest
rates
.
The banker's preference for taking risk will influence the
strategy for management of bond maturities. A more speculative
banker would not necessarily keep maturities as short as possible
and would be profiting from such a strategy under 1985 condi-
tions. A more risk-averse banker would maintain shorter maturi-
ties in order to minimize the adverse effects of a rise in inter-
est rates. Of course, it is important to remember that manipula-
tion of bond maturities is subject to other risk management
constraints.
Liquidity management is often a constraint on investment
risk management. The bank is obligated to meet withdrawal demand
and must make loans to function as a profitable financial inter-
mediary. Investment risk problems may be superceded by the
40
bank's liquidity needs. Management of investment and liquidity
risk must often be done simultaneously.
Summary . Investment risk is spawned by a variety of factors
and may be treated in a variety of ways. Interest rates, bond
maturities, and liquidity needs are all factors in this process.
Liquidity risk and cost of funds risk are also managed with the
investment portfolio, so investment risk management may become a
secondary goal in overall risk management.
LIQUIDITY RISK
Liquidity risk is the risk that the bank will be unable to
meet demands for funds. There is also a micro-macro distinction
in the management of liquidity risk; the micro or daily manage-
ment of the bank's money position is done as a matter of standard
operating procedures, while macro liquidity management involves
making and implementing longer-run strategies. Over the longer
run, there are three different types of liquidity needs: sea-
sonal, cyclical and trend. 17 Each type of liquidity need may
require a different response, so proper diagnosis of a liquidity
problem is a major part of its treatment.
Banks must meet immediate obligations such as withdrawals
and legitimate loan demands. A bank is also obligated to meet
reserve requirements. A banker does not want to maintain a
larger liquidity reserve than necessary since this would result
in an excess of low or. non-earning assets and lower long-run
profitability. On the other hand, too small a liquidity reserve
may result in severe financial problems and even failure.
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Clearly, a bank can benefit by competent liquidity measurement
and management.
Measurement . Proper evaluation of a liquidity need is nec-
essary to best determine the appropriate response to that risk.
Since a wide variety of responses to liquidity risk are avail-
able, an early and accurate diagnosis is valuable. "The best
guides available to most banks are their past experience and
knowledge of events likely to affect liquidity needs." 18 Spe-
cific guides include both quantitative measures, consisting of
several ratios, and qualitative measures, which in elude the ex-
perience and knowledge of past liquidity needs and treatments.
Quantitative measures include some ratios which relate li-
quidity needs to the liquidity reserves available. A ratio ap-
propriate for evaluating short term liquidity risk is the short
term assets/short term liabilities ratio. It relates rela-
tively liquid reserves to relatively short term uses. However,
some short term assets are used to meet the bank's reserve re-
quirements "and are not liquid assets which may be used to meet
loan demands or deposit outflows." 1 ^ Thus, an individual bank
may refine its short term ratio to some sort of "sensitive
source s / sensit ive uses" ratio. *** Again, these measures would be
most effective in monitoring liquidity risk on a short term or
seasonal basis.
To examine longer term or trend liquidity risk, the loan/de-
posit ratio would be more appropriate, since it relates the
bank's primary use of funds to its primary source of funds. A
higher loan/ deposit ratio would indicate less liquidity available
for unexpected trends of greater liquidity need.
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Some quantitative measures of deposit characteristics are
helpful in determining liquidity needs. Some deposits are more
prone to withdrawal on short notice; competitive conditions,
size, and interest rate sensitivity of deposits influence deposit
volatility. The ratio of time deposits /total deposits shows the
importance of time deposits, which may be sensitive to interest
rate changes. A bank may develop similar indicators of the
volatility of other deposits since its own demand deposits,
savings deposits, and certificates of deposit may have different
degrees of volatility.
Another consideration in liquidity risk measurement is the
composition of the investment portfolio. The composition of the
investment portfolio considers the availability of securities
which may not be sold to provide liquidity. Not all securities
are available for immediate sale. Some are pledged against
public deposits, some lack a suitable secondary market, and
others may produce an undesirable capital loss if sold.
Trends in the use of purchased liquidity (i.e., purchasing
Fed Funds from another bank or borrow in g from the Federal Reserve
discount window) are an indicator of the liquidity of the rest of
the bank's resources. Extensive use of Fed Funds or borrow ing
from the Federal Reserve discount window when the bank is not in
a period of seasonal shortage indicates that the bank's other
liquidity reserves may be low; purchasing liquidity is quite
acceptable in periods of seasonal shortage, but regulators frown
upon its extensive use beyond these periods.
Management . Meeting the bank's reserve requirements is a
43
necessity.
"The philosophy in managing the required reserves
port ion of a bank's money position is usually just
to meet the bank's required reserves with acceptable
assets. . . . By 1988, acceptable assets will in-
clude only vault cash, deposits at the Federal Re-
serve, and pass-through accounts to the Federal Re-
serve . "21
BankB typical ly meet any shortfalls here through the use of pur-
chased liquidity.
Over a somewhat longer time span, seasonal liquidity needs
may appear. The timing and extent of seasonal liquidity risk may
be unique for each bank and past experience is perhaps the best
gauge of this type of liquidity risk. Although purchased liquid-
ity is an acceptable response for seasonal liquidity needs,
seasonal needs could also be met from the sale of loans or the
maturing or sale of securities from the investment portfolio, or
through participation loans.
Over an even longer time span, trend liquidity needs may
develop. "These longer term liquidity needs are generally re-
lated to the secular trends of the community or market that a
bank serves ..2 2 If predicted loan growth is greater than pre-
dicted deposit growth, then the bank must find new sources of
liquidity or else have its liquidity position weakened. One
response would be to raise the loan/deposit ratio. However, this
action may change the bank's capital adequacy. The bank could
also become more selective in its lending in an attempt to curb
loan growth. Purchased liquidity is not regarded as a viable
alternative for meeting trend liquidity needs since the bank
should meet these permanent liquidity changes with its own re-
sources, not the resources of others.
44
Another important element in the liquidity management pro-
cess is the investment portfolio. Management of marketability
and maturity of securities are the controls the bank has to
maintain adequate liquidity in the investment portfolio. Three
formalized strategies exist for the management of the maturity
structure of the investment portfolio; these are the "laddered"
approach, the "barbell" approach, and the "buffer" approach. 23
The laddered strategy involves staggering maturities such that
approximately the same amount matures each year, while the bar-
bell approach lumps maturities at either end of the maturity
spectrum. The buffer approach concentrates maturities at the
short end of the maturity spectrum. The buffer approach is the
best alternative for periods of high liquidity risk because
"with a high concentration of securities in the
short end of the maturity spectrum the bank has
gr ea t er 1 iquidi ty with which to cope with tight
credit conditions, strong loan demand, deposit,
outflows, or a sharply rising cost of funds."
The shorter maturities of the buffer approach are also consistent
with a risk-averse investment risk management strategy.
Summary . Liquidity risk measurement and management are the
processes of identifying the nature of liquidity risks and insti-
tuting the appropriate procedures to treat them. Liquidity needs
may be daily, seasonal, or even longer-term in nature, and dif-
ferent responses may be necessary in each of these cases. Man-
agement of liquidity risk may involve both limiting the flow of
funds from the bank and tapping new liquidity reserves within the
bank. The liquidity risk management process is necessary to
ensure that the bank can meet its obligations of providing funds
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for its customers in a timely fashion.
COST OF FUNDS RISK
Cost of funds risk is the risk of unfavorable changes in the
bank's cost of funds. Changes may be unfavorable when costs go
up faster than earnings or when costs do not decline as quickly
as earnings. Some refer to this risk as "income risk," since
both earnings and costs of funds are factors in determining the
effects on bank income resulting from changes in interest rates.
Income risk has been defined as "the risk of loss in net interest
income [resulting] from movements in borrowing and lending rates
not being perfectly synchronized." 25 Whatever the name used,
this risk is a danger to banks' profitability.
Measurement . Cost of funds risk is monitored with a number
of measures, including gaps, spreads, and ratios. Gap models
with varying degrees of sophistication exist and are coming into
more common use. Spreads have been monitored for years. The
composition of the loan and investment portfolios with respect to
maturity and yield and the sensitivity of deposits to interest
rate changes are measures for cost of funds risk. The most
sophisticated measures may not be necessary; some bankers feel
they can monitor risk with simpler, less costly models.
Gap models incorporate the size and maturity or duration of
both interest-sensitive assets and liabilities. They predict the
effects on the bank from both rising and falling interest rates,
both of which may be beneficial or damaging. The banker must
decide whether to actively manage the gap, which would produce
profits if interest rate changes are forecast accurately, or to
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immunize the bank against any negative effects caused by interest
rate changes. In deciding which gap model to use, bankers must
also evaluate their own needs and capabilities for maintaining
such a system. Some smaller banks may have neither the need for
nor the capability of instituting the more sophisticated systems.
The basic gap model derives its name from the "gap" between
the dollar amounts of rate-sensitive assets (RSA) and rate-
sensitive liabilities (RSL) for a given time horizon (GAP = RSA -
RSL). To hedge against interest rate changes, this model sug-
gests setting GAP equal to zero. A rate change would influence
interest income and interest expense equal ly and oppositely and
leave profits unchanged. A positive gap would prove beneficial
in times of rising rates and undesirable in periods of falling
rates; these conditions would be reversed for a negative gap.
Most bankers in the Tenth Federal Reserve District have typically
maintained positive gaps over the last several years.
More sophisticated models have been designed to correct
shortcomings in the basic gap model.
"A major problem with the basic gap model is
that it computes GAP as the difference between
RSA and RSL regardless of when the assets and
liabilities are repriced within the gapping per-
More sophisticated gap models divide the gapping period into
several subintervals
,
measure the gap within each of these
shorter repricing periods, and sum the gaps for each of these
smaller intervals or "maturity buckets," to find the cumulative
gap for the whole period. This refinement reduces the problem of
differing maturities but does not eliminate it.
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Duration gap models provide another measure of cost funds
risk. Instead of dividing assets and liabilities into different
maturity buckets within the entire gapping period, the duration
of all rate-sensitive assets and liabilities are considered in
one calculation which eliminates the repricing question. The
formula for the duration gap having net interest income as its
target account is
DG = MVRSAU - DRgA ) - HVRSL ( 1 - D RSL )
where: DG duration gap (a dollar value);
MVRSA market value of rate-sensitive assets at the beg-
ginning of the gapping period;
MVRSL = market value of rate-sensitive liabilities at the
beginning of the gapping period;
'RSA the duration (the weighted average time to re-
pricing) of RSA; and
28DRSL = t 'le duration of RSL.
The larger the duration gap becomes in absolute value, the
greater the cost of funds risk exposure becomes. As defined
here, a positive gap will have analagous effects to the positive
gap in the basic model.
Two other measures of cost of funds risk that are quite sim-
ilar are spread and net interest margin. A bank's spread "is the
difference between interest returns (interest revenues divided by
earning assets) and interest costs (interest expenses divided by
inter est-bear ing funds). "29
-phe spread thus shows how much of an
interest rate margin the bank has to cover its non-interest costs
and profits, and how much buffer exists for unexpected increases
in costs of funds. Average net interest margin equals gross
interest revenue as a proportion of average assets minus gross
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interest expense as a proportion of average assets. Average net
interest margins for banks having less than 300 million dollars
ranged from 4.19 to 5.20 percentage points from 1976 to 1983.30
Factors influencing cost of funds risk which are exogenous
to the bank are the behavior of interest rates and the conditions
which influence them, the nature of the bank's competition, and
the sensitivity of a bank's deposits to interest rate changes.
The bank can only anticipate market interest rate changes from
the conditions that produce them; it cannot control those condi-
tions itself. Competition is important in that it influences the
sensitivity of the bank's deposits to changes in interest rates
as banks compete for funds on a pricing basis.
Management . Management of cost of funds risk involves the
manipulation of the factors which influence the bank's risk
exposure. These are maturities or durations of both assets and
liabilities, and the rates received or paid on these accounts.
The use of financial futures contracts is another innovation in
cost of funds risk management which may be incorporated into the
various gap models. Another important tool is the variable rate
loan, which shifts the risk from the bank to the borrower. Bank-
ers may use several of these responses in their treatment of cost
of funds risk.
Managing the bank's gap involves several steps. First, the
bank must decide which model is best for its needs and most
feasible in its operations. The basic gap model is the most
simple model; more complex gap models with more maturitiy buckets
are next; the duration gap model with net interest income as the
target account is probably the most complex.
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The desired gap would be created through the sale or pur-
chase of loans, securities, financial futures contract s, or Fed
Funds, or through the manipulation of the prices and maturities
of both assets and liabilities. The gap management process would
begin anew as the new gap would be calculated, new forecasts
made, and additional actions taken to create the new desired gap.
Since asset and liablility pricing and maturities, and sales and
purchases of other instruments are subject to other risk manage-
ment considerations, decisions must be integrated into an overall
risk management strategy.
Financial futures contracts transfer cost of funds risk away
from the bank without transferring it to the borrower. Financial
futures are used in a hedging gap strategy where the value of the
futures contract s bought or sold is combined with the other
ac count s to produce a gap which is immunized against cost of
funds risk. However, practical problems have limited the adop-
tion of financial futures. Since knowledge of the precise amount
to be hedged is a requirement, a fairly complex gap model is
necessary. Margin calls may make the process costly; some exper-
tise in futures trading is necessary, too; therefore, only larger
banks typically use financial futures. Unfavorable regulatory
3 1
and accounting treatments make them less attractive, as well.
Management of the bank's spread or net interest margin also
involves the pricing of both assets and liabilities. Bankers who
do not use other measures such as gaps to manage cost of funds
risk may necessarily maintain a higher spread to offset the lack
of protection otherwise offered by gap management. Net interest
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margins for smaller banks are typically wider but more variable
than those of large regional or money center banks. 32 Competi-
tive or economic forces working to narrow the spread may prompt
bankers to charge higher service fees to cover noninterest oper-
ating costs, since the narrower spread indicates that there is
less interest margin to cover these costs. Research indicates
that noninterest income as a percent of total assets has risen in
recent years . J
Finally, variable rate loans are important tools in trans-
ferring cost of funds risk away from the bank. These loans allow
the bank to adjust its loan rates whenever interest costs change.
However, variable rate loans pass the cost of funds risk on to
the borrower; this may then increase the bank's credit risk
exposure. The banker must decide whether this is an acceptable
trade-off in the management of the variable rate loan program.
Summ a ry . Cost of funds risk is an important risk in that it
greatly influences bank profitability. A number of measurement
and management techniques have been developed to reduce banks'
exposure to this risk. These procedures vary in complexity and
effectiveness. Each banker must decide which procedures will
provide the best results. New techniques for cost of funds man-
agement may even allow the bank to profit from changes in inter-
est rates that previously would have been harmful.
SOLVENCY RISK
Insolvency occurs when the bank's capital becomes inade-
quate as its asset values decline relative to the value of claims
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against the bank. Insolvency may be the product of problems in
different areas of the bank. Loan charge-offs and other losses
resulting from investment, liquidity, and cost of funds risk
exposures reduce bank capital. Internal earnings as a source of
capital may be impaired by these losses. Loan and deposit growth
may be great enough that the capital is rendered inadequate
without special measures to supplement it. Several measures of
solvency risk monitor the adequacy of the capital account dir-
ectly or indirectly by monitoring other types of risk. Manage-
ment of solvency risk deals directly with the capital account as
well as other types of risk.
Measurement . A number of ratios are used to determine
capital adequacy. These ratios measure the adequacy of the
bank's capital by comparing the capital account to other accounts
and by monitoring other accounts and activities that affect the
capital account.
Ratios which directly monitor the adequacy of the capital
account include capital /as sets and classified assets /capital.
Of these, the capital/ as sets ratio is the most commonly used
ratio. Asset devaluation is a major insolvency risk, this ratio
is useful because it shows how much asset devaluation would
produce insolvency.
The classified as sets /capital ratio measures capital
adequacy by comparing the assets of lower quality to the capital
account. Some portion of these assets will be charged off
against capital when bankers or examiners decide they are worth-
less, and capital must be adequate to cover these losses.
Measures for other types of banking risk are also valuable
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in evaluating solvency risk exposure. Perhaps the most important
of these monitors credit risk exposure since bad loans are di-
rectly charged off against capital. Cost of funds risk is impor-
tant in determining capital adequacy since earnings are a major
source of capital and cost of funds risk can produce major earn-
ings problems. The loan/ depo sit ratio might even be considered a
measure of capital adequacy since a relatively higher ratio would
indicate that the bank was investing more in riskier assets
(i.e., loans) relative to claims against the bank. Risky assets
would require more capital in the bank's financial structure. A
1980 study indicates that less risky banks are able to maintain
3 5lower capitalization levels. "*
In evaluating capital adequacy, examiners also consider
qualitative factors such as the quality of management and operat-
ing procedures, the nature of competition and its effects on the
bank's operations, and the nature of bank ownership. 3 " These
factors are considered because of their influence on overall bank
operations and, thus, capital adequacy.
Management . Management of solvency risk involves maintain-
ing capital adequacy through both capital infusion and management
of the other factors affecting capital adequacy. Credit risk
management could even be considered an indirect form of solvency
risk management. Indeed, every other risk management procedure
which bolsters profits could be indirectly considered solvency
risk management, since retained earnings are banks' most impor-
tant source of capital.^ Thus, there are both direct and
indirect treatments for solvency risk.
53
A number of direct treatments are available to enhance the
adequacy of the bank's capital. When solvency risk is per-
ceived to be greater, infusion of capital may come from both
external and internal sources. Public stock issues were the most
important source of external capital for large bank holding com-
panies in the 1970's; other sources included capital of acquired
banks, debt conversions, and employee stock plans." If the bank
is closely held, as are many banks in Kansas, existing owners
would be the primary source of capital since no active market
would be readily available for selling stock. Regulators may
consider subordinated debt as capital if it meets certain re-
quirements. However, a loss "cannot be charged against debt
capital in order to maintain the bank as a going concern,"^ so
the use of subordinated debt capital may be limited. The nature
of the infused capital would depend on the nature of the need for
capital .
The internal source of capital for a bank is the earnings it
generates through normal operations. Some earnings are retained
and reinvested in the bank rather than being paid out to owners
as dividends. Thus, both profitability and dividend policy in-
fluence the internal generation of capital. Dividend policy may
be conditional on the nature of bank ownership; if the bank's
6tock is not actively traded, payout policy may be more discre-
tionary. Dividends may be restricted in crisis conditions
to provide necessary capital for the bank.
Indirect management of solvency risk involves maintenance
of profitability through both sound daily operating procedures
and competent risk management on a macro level. Credit risk
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management is quite important since loan charge-offs are a major
threat to the bank's capital. Cost of funds risk management
helps maintain profitability, particularly during periods of
volatile interest rates. Sound operations also inspire confi-
dence from depositors and regulators.
Summ ary . Solvency risk measurement and management work to
ensure that the bank's capital remains adequate. Management
involves the infusion of capital from external sources when nec-
essary, and the generation of capital from internal operations.
Internal operations which are both profitable and safe are thus
important factors in solvency risk management.
REGULATORY RISK
Regulatory risk result s from change s in the regulatory
environment. It differs from other risks in that regulatory risk
frequently creates other types of risk for the bank. This being
the case, regulatory risk measurement and management are differ-
ent in nature from most other measurement and management tech-
niques used by banks. Regulatory risk measurement is much less
quantitative, and regulatory risk management is typically done by
groups of banks rather than by individual banks.
Measurement . No ratios, indices, gaps, spreads, or other
amounts are used to measure a bank's regulatory risk exposure.
Qualitative indicators of regulatory risk do exist, however, and
bankers may rely on these sources plus their own intuition to
forecast the effects of potential regulatory changes.
Indicators of regulatory risk come from regulators, the
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banking industry itself, and legislative bodies. Regulators
have knowledge of proposed regulatory changes and should under-
stand how any procedural change will function and what the likely
effects of these changes will be. Thus, regulatory publications
and contacts are important sources of information. Similarly,
banking industry publications and contacts provide valuable in-
formation on both the implementation and the effects of regula-
tory changes. Finally, legislative activities and contacts are
important sources of information, particularly since it is local,
state, and national legislative bodies which enact many of the
regulatory changes.
Management . The individual banker is often a spectator
watching the regulatory environment change, with little individ-
ual power to control the ultimate changes. Some bankers may act
collectively, however, to influence potential regulatory changes.
Several banking organizations exist for purposes which in-
clude lobbying for causes important to the banking industry. The
American Bankers Association (ABA) is the largest banking organ-
ization in this country. The ABA and other smaller banking
organizations with narrower interests lobby in Washington for
banking causes. One prime example of the influence of the
banking industry is the repeal of the interest income withholding
law in 19 83 which came after intense protests by banks and other
financial institutions. State-wide organizations like the Kansas
Bankers Association provide state legislators with input from
the banking community.
Different interest groups within the state's banking indus-
try have formed to lobby for their own interests, as was the case
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in the multibank holding company debate in Kansas in the 1980's.
Contributions to and support of these groups or other political
action committees are in many cases the only options an individ-
ual banker has in influencing the writing of new regulations.
Although individual bankers may not have much voice in
writing regulations, they may anticipate these regulatory actions
and take steps to deal with the changes caused by the new regula-
tory environment. Development of legislative, industry, and
regulatory contacts may allow bankers to better anticipate regu-
latory changes, evaluate the effects of these potential changes,
and institute measures to deal with these new conditions. Anti-
cipation of the effects of regulatory changes could be important
in allowing time to develop strategies to cope with a new banking
environment
.
Summary . Regulatory risk is thus a unique type of risk,
with unique methods of both measurement and management. Its
measurement is qualitative in nature, and its management is
unique in that individual bankers can do little to reduce risk
themselves; their only option is to anticipate it and respond to
it as best they can. Collectively, bankers may have some influ-
ence on the regulatory process. Regulatory changes may affect
each bank differently, depending on the nature of the regulatory
change and the bank's size, location, markets, competition, and
other characteristics.
SUMMARY OF OVERALL RISK MANAGEMENT
Many interrelationships exist between the risks in the over-
all operation of the bank. The different types of risk are not
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all treated in an individual, isolated fashion but are managed
together when necessary. Bank goals other than risk minimization
must also be considered.
The interrelationships between the risks are many. One im-
portant relationship is between credit risk and solvency risk;
loan losses result in charge-offs against capital. All other
risks influence the level of solvency risk exposure, too, inas-
much as they affect profitability and safety, which in turn
affect capital adequacy. Regulatory risk works in the opposite
manner — it may be the root of other types of risk. Investment
risk, liquidity risk, and cost of funds risk are all intertwined
in the management of the investment portfolio, gaps, spreads, and
maturities. Cost of funds risk and credit risk interact through
variable rate loans. The point is clear: risk management should
integrate all relevant factors into the treatment of risk.
Other bank goals are also necessary considerations when
choosing the best methods of risk management. One important bank
goal is profitability; bankers must decide how much risk is ac-
ceptable and how much profit is necessary. Examiners also limit
risk-taking through minimum captial ization levels, monitoring of
purchased liquidity, and routine loan reviews. A second major
bank goal to be considered is service of the public interest. In
the short run, some risk management may not seem to serve the
public's interest, at least in some customers' eyes. One example
of this is foreclosure. A bank could receive negative publicity
if a borrower claims that work-out is still possible. The per-
ception would be created that the bank is interested only in
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profits and not in its customers. The bank must decide when its
own interests supercede some individual's interests. In the long
run, however, there is really no conflict, since sound risk
management inspires public confidence by producing safe opera-
tions, sound financial markets, and efficient intermediation
services
.
REVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT LITERATURE
There is a great body of literature concerned with risk man-
agement in banking. The banking industry and the academic com-
munity each have a number of publications serving their own par-
ticular interests. Numerous textbooks also provide discussions
of risk management in banking. Many empirical studies have al-
ready been cited in this chapter, and many more empirical studies
may be found in the publications listed below. Several theoreti-
cal discussions of banking risk management have also been men-
tioned, and many others may also be found in the following
sources
.
Several periodicals are oriented toward providing the bank-
ing industry with information on risk management. A list of
these includes The Bankers Magazine . The Magazine of Bank Admin-
istration
. Savings and Loan News . American Bankers Association
Banking Journal
. and numerous Federal Reserve System publica-
tions. While these periodicals all contain empirical research on
the use of risk management procedures (several of them have been
cited in this report), their primary concern is providing bankers
with instruction on the implementation of risk management pro-
cedures, rationale for these practices, and the probable
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consequences of various risk management options. These types of
articles provide bankers with more practical information for bank
operations rather than empirical research, as would an academic
journal. Several articles from these publications have been
cited in this study, but most articles emphasize practical appli-
cation for the banking industry.
Publications having greater emphasis on empirical research
on banking risk management include The Journal of Bank Research .
The Journal of Money. Credit . and Banking . The Journal of Com -
m ercial Bank Lending , and The Journal of Finance . The Federal
Reserve System is also a source of empirical research. Articles
on risk management in these publications tend to focus on very
specific areas of risk, such as the effects of changing interest
rates, the effects of changing regulations, and risk in the loan
portfolio. Articles from* some of these publications have also
provided information for this study.
Numerous textbooks cover all areas of risk measurement and
management. Much of their information is compiled from that
found in the periodicals and journals just mentioned.
Certain concepts from other research were incorporated into
this study. This study's examination of financial information
required from agricultural borrowers was inspired by a similar
examination in a 1977 Louisiana State University study. ^0 Parts
of Booth, Smith, and Stolz's study of the use of financial fu-
tures contracts was also adapted for this research. ' This
study's examination of loan renewals and security requirements
was inspired by similar studies by the Federal Reserve Bank of
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Kansas City.^ 2 Finally, examination of gaps and spreads in this
report incorporated certain aspects of Mitchell's research on
Tenth Federal Reserve District banks . ^3
This study of risk management is unique in many ways, how-
ever. A review of risk management literature revealed no studies
which examined risk management from such a broad perspective as
this report does; most empirical research tended to focus on very
specific areas of risk management. This study is unique in its
examination of perceptions of the relative importance of all
risks and the relative importance of measures of all types of
risk. No other studies were found which examined the extent of
use of risk management practices in the same fashion as does this
paper. Thus, this report is original in many aspects of its
examination of risk management.
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This chapter provides a review of the rationale used in de-
signing this study as well as more specific descriptions of the
survey instrument and the statistical analyses used. The discus-
sion of the rationale for this study includes a review of the
nature of the problem, the research alternatives available, and
why the chosen avenues were deemed most appropriate for achieving
the study's objectives. The description of the survey design
includes discussions of the general areas of inquiry, the general
types of questions used, and the purposes of the individual ques-
tions. The statistical analysis section involves discussions of
the types of tests used.
DATA COLLECTION: GENERAL METHODOLOGY AND RATIONALE
The discussion of methodology evaluates the type of informa-
tion-gathering instrument used, the rationale for its design, and
the group of bankers from which the data was collected. This
discussion necessarily involves a review of the study's objec-
tives, the constraints imposed by the nature of the problem, and
the advantages and disadvantages of each of the alternative
methods of study.
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As outlined in the introduction of this paper, the study's
objectives are to:
1) determine which risks bankers perceive as most
important, and why they perceive them as such;
2) examine how bankers measure the different risks
they face ;
3) examine how bankers respond to these risks;
4) examine how these measurement and management
practices have changed over time; and
5) examine differences in practices and performance
among different types of banks.
Thus, the information-gathering instrument was selected and de-
signed with these object ives in mind. The survey group was
chosen s imi lar ly
.
The study of banking risks imposed certain constraints on
the research options available. Quantifying the preferences for
risk measurement, opinions on the importance of risk, and the ex-
tent of risk responses was the greatest constraint. Ranking and
rating schemes were used in these situations to create ordinal
data. Only certain nonpar am etric analyses are acceptable for
viewing some statistical relationships for this type of data.
Two major decisions in the data collection process con-
cerned the method of collection and the group of banks from which
the data were to be collected. The alternative methods of collec-
tion were surveys and personal interviews. Two advantages of
using a survey were the greater number of responses received and
the relatively smaller time requirement. One disadvantage of the
survey method was the inability to ask complex and follow-up
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questions. Another disadvantage vas the lack of control over the
number, the completeness, and the correctness of responses. In-
t erv iew s offered the advantages of more in-depth questioning and
greater control over the number and nature of respondents ques-
tioned — that is, a "representative" sample could have been
defined and interviewed. Disadvantages of interviewing included
the narrower base of respondents questioned, the greater time
requirement of the interview process, and the difficulty of
defining a representative sample of banks.
The alternatives considered with regard to the type of banks
surveyed were: 1) to question only agricultural banks within the
state of Kansas, since this group was perceived as facing the
greatest problems at the time; and 2) to question all Kansas
banks, both agricultural and otherwise. Under the second option,
the performance and practices of agricultural and nonagr icul tur al
bank could be compared. This option would also provide broader
responses with respect to the size of respondent banks.
The options chosen for this study were to survey all Kansas
banks. A survey was deemed to be the best alternative for a num-
ber of reasons. First, a greater number of responses would be
obtained via a survey, and with the diversity of banking prac-
tices in the state, a survey would be more likely to capture a
diversity of answers, compared to a limited number of interviews.
Questions with sufficient detail could be asked in a survey
format; in-depth explanations feasible only in interview situa-
tions were not deemed necessary. Finally, the survey alterna-
tive was also deemed to have a smaller time requirement.
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The group surveyed included the entire population of Kansas
banks. This group was chosen over the subset of the state's
agricultural banks because of the greater diversity of informa-
tion received and the availability of nonagricultural banks as a
group for comparison to the agricultural banks. Surveying all
banks was preferrable to questioning a "representative" sample
because of the difficulty of defining a representative group and
the greater information provided by a larger group of respon-
dents.
DESIGN OF SURVEY AND SAMPLING METHODS
Five general areas of inquiry were established in the design
of the questionnaire. These areas for the most part paralleled
the study's objectives. The survey design process also involved
the selection of the types of questions used on the question-
naire. The next step in the process was the formulation of the
individual questions. This was followed by an informal pre-test
designed to solicit suggestions for improvement. The survey it-
self was also designed to encourage response. The objective was
to produce a survey that would be understandable to the respon-
dents and informative for the researcher.
General areas of inquiry . The five general areas of inquiry
on the questionnaire were:
1) bank characteristics;
2) identifying risk;
3) measures of risk;
4) risk responses; and
5) the agricultural lending function and risk responses.
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The objective of examining changing practices over time was in-
corporated into questions within each of the other areas of
inquiry
.
The bank characteristics section solicited information on
size, location, nature of ownership and charter, and other fac-
tors which described the respondent bank. These characteristics
were useful in the classification of banks when analyzing how
different types of banks managed their operations. Questions in
the risk identification section were designed to determine which
risks bankers perceived as most important, how these perceptions
had changed over time, and why these perceptions were held. The
risk measurement section inquired about risk management tools
used by bankers, how the use of these tools had changed over
time, and which risks the bankers perceived as being the most
difficult to measure. The risk response section examined the use
of various risk management procedures and how the use of these
responses had changed over time. The section for risk responses
in agricultural lending solicited information on the importance
of agricultural lending to the bank and on the specific responses
to risk originating in the agricultural loan portfolio.
Types of quest ions . Several different types of questions
were used to gather the information from the banks. In many
types of questions the respondent was instructed to rank various
factors from the most important to the least important. This
rating scheme was used in instances where it was necessary to
determine the factors' relative importance to each other. An-
other type of quesion asked the respondent to rate the importance
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of various factors. These rating schemes were used to measure
the importance of each factor without the same sort of direct
comparison among the factors as in the ranking questions.
A third method of inquiry appeared in many of the rating and
ranking questions. The respondent was provided the opportunity
to write in and rank or rate factors not mentioned on a particu-
lar question. These opportunities were provided to allow bankers
to mention any factors not considered by the researchers in the
formulation of the questionnaire.
Types of questions used to determine bank characteristics
were "YES-HO" questions, questions where the respondent was sim-
ply to "check" or "circle" some factor, and fill-in questions
where the respondent was to write some amount or number as the
situation required. No essay questions were used because of the
difficulty in categorizing essay responses and the barrier essay
questions would have presented to quick completion of the ques-
tionnaire .
Formulating individual questions . The process of formulat-
ing the individual questions was a lengthy one. The question-
naire had to be understandable to the respondent and analytically
valuable to the researcher. The questionnaire went through sev-
eral drafts before these objectives were deemed to be satisfied.
A copy of the questionnaire is in Appendix A for reference.
The first area of inquiry, "Bank Characteristics," contained
eight questions, all of which were fill-in or check questions.
The first four questions solicited information on size, capital
adequacy, liquidity preferences, and profitability. Questions 2
and 3 dealt with capital/asset and loan/deposit ratios, both of
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both of which may be used as indicators of risk preference.
Question 5 determined the nature of the bank's charter; Question
6 examined the nature of bank ownership. Question 7 determined
the bank's location, since geographical differences were to be
analyzed. The final question of the section, Question 8, de-
termined the experience of the chief executive officer to permit
analysis of differences in management practices as management
experience varied.
The next section, "Identifying Risk," contained five ques-
tions. Question 9 asked for a ranking of the six banking risks
to determine their relative importance in risk management deci-
sion-making; a ranking was requested for five years ago, three
years ago, today and two to three years in the future. An oppor-
tunity was provided for mention of other risks the respondent
perceived as important and not adequately described by the listed
classes of risk. Question 10 solicited a rating for each of
several factors to determine why the risks were rated as they
were on Question 9 — that is, to show how important these fac-
tors were in determining the relative importance of the risks.
Opportunity was provided to write in other influential factors.
Question 11 asked for a rating of the bank's overall health
through the rating scheme commonly known in the banking industry
as the CAMEL rating; this question was included to establish an
objective reference point for evaluating the health and risk
exposure of the banks. Question 12 was a follow-up question that
determined which risks had the greatest effects in changing the
bank's overall health. Question 13 was another follow-up ques-
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tion which showed how the individual CAMEL factors changed over
time and provided another indication of the importance of and the
exposure to the various risks. Together, all of these questions
determined the bankers' perceptions of risk faced by their opera-
tions over the last five years.
"Measures of Risk," the third area of inquiry, had only two
questions. Question 14 asked for a ranking of the measures used
in monitoring each type of risk for three separate time periods
(five years ago, three years ago, and today). Several measures
were listed for each of the six risks, and write-in options were
provided. The respondent was asked to create a hierarchy among
these measures to show which ones were more (or less) important
in monitoring the bank's risk exposure. Question 15 asked for a
ranking of the risks according to the difficulty with which they
are monitored. Thus, these questions determined how the bankers
measured risk, which measures were more important, how their
importance had changed over time, and which risks were most
difficult to monitor.
The fourth section, "Risk Responses," had eight questions
and was the longest section of the questionnaire. The first
question asked bankers to rate the use of various risk management
procedures and how the use of each practice had changed over
time. Practices associated with credit risk which were rated
included diversification of the various portfolios, loan in-
surance, loan guarantee programs, and review of loan policies.
Investment risk management practices evaluated included gap
management and investment portfolio management. Liquidity risk
management techniques rated included investment portfolio
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management, participation loans, loan sales, and solicitation of
deposits via incen tive /premium programs. Management techniques
rated for cost of funds risk included variable rate loans, finan-
cial futures, gap management, and deposit pricing policies. Sol-
vency risk management techniques considered included, indirectly,
almost all of the other practices already mentioned, and direct-
ly, the limiting of dividends and the increasing of the number of
income centers within the bank.
The second part of the "Risk Responses" section examined a
number of risk management practices in greater detail. Question
17 was directed at the use of diversification to deal with credit
risk in the loan portfolio and to deal with deposit liquidity
risk. Questions 18, 19, and 20 were concerned with overline loan
requests and participation loans. Question 21 inquired about
the importance of the various barriers to the use of financial
futures since adoption of this technique has been slow. Question
22 examined gap management by looking at the sign of the bank's
gap; this is also a gauge of bankers' interest rate expectations
(the model implied in the question was the basic gap model).
Question 23 considered how the bank's spread had changed over
time.
The final area of inquiry, "The Agricultural Lending Func-
tion and Risk Responses," dealt with the nature of the agricul-
tural lending program and the risks related to it. Unlike the
three previous sections, it consisted only of check or fill-in
questions. Questions 24 through 27 described the nature of the
agricultural lending program. Questions 24, 25, and 26 deter-
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mined both its absolute and relative size and importance. Ques-
tion 27 inquired about the bank's ability to handle today's
larger agricultural loans.
Questions 28 through 35 dealt with credit risk and other
risk considerations in the agricultural loan portfolio. Question
28 was used to examine how demand for financial information from
agricultural borrowers has changed over time. Questions 29 and
30 considered how banks protect their interests via collateral
requirements. Questions 31 and 32 both dealt with credit risk in
that they both considered terms of repayment; they dealt with
cost of funds risk also in that they were concerned with asset
maturity. Question 33 examined how the quality of farm loan
portfolios has changed over time as a gauge of credit risk expo-
sure. Question 34 examined the use of another credit risk man-
agement tool, guaranteed loans. Question 35 dealt with both the
quality of the bank's agricultural loans and its willingness and
ability to use them as a source of liquidity.
Imp lement ing the survey . One step taken to improve the
quality of the questionnaire was a pre-test process. A prelimi-
nary draft of the questionnaire was sent to several bankers and
the executive staff of the Kansas Bankers Association (KBA) to
solicit their suggestions on length , subject matter, clarity and
wording of the questions, and other pertinent considerations.
Several suggestions were incorporated into the final draft of the
ques tionnair e .
Other steps were taken to encourage a greater response to
the survey. First, a letter of endorsement from the KBA was
included with the departmental letter in the preface to the
73
questionnaire as an indication of industry support and approval
of the survey. The KBA also encouraged response through a notice
in the September 1985 issue of their monthly publication, The
Kansas Banker , and through announcements at bank management
training seminars held throughout the state during the month of
September. To ensure that the questionnaire would reach the
chief executive officers, the questionnaires were sent directly
to the chief executive officers (rather than simply to the banks)
from a mailing list provided by the KBA. Also, business reply
envelopes were supplied for greater convenience to the respon-
dent. Finally, a follow-up letter was mailed in early October as
a reminder to complete and return the form.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES DSED
A variety of different situations were examined, requiring a
number of different statistical tests. The nature of the data
for each particular situation determined the type of test used.
Some questions such as the ranking questions produced data which
did not satisfy the requirements for using parametric tests, so
only nonparametric tests were possible in these cases.
The nonparametric Friedman test was used to examine rankings
of factors within one time period to determine if at least one
factor tended to be ranked differently from at least one other
factor. If some rankings tended to be different, then the sum of
the ranks for the different factors would tend to be different,
and the test statistic, which uses a chi-square distribution,
would become significantly large. • This test was used in compar-
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ing the rankings of risks and risk measurement tools.
The Friedman test would also have been the appropriate test
to compare the rankings given to just two different factors
within one time period. These comparisons were not made, how-
ever, because although
"further comparisons between treatments [could]
be made by repeatedly applying the Friedman test
to the reduced number of treatments, . . . very
little meaning may be attached to [the signifi-
cance level] in the subsequent tests." 2
Three different statistical tests were used to compare
rankings and ratings given by different groups of banks (e.g.,
agricultural versus nonagr icult ural). The first test involved an
analysis of variance procedure to detect significant differences
among the means of the different groups. If the F-test showed
significance, the least significant difference (LSD) t-test was
used to determine whether significant differences existed among
the means of particular groups at the .10 level of significance.
This process produced "protected" LSD comparisons, an important
precaution since many comparisons were made and the unprotected
LSD procedure is likely to incorrectly indicate significance on
at least some tests when many comparisons are performed.-3 To
detect significant differences which existed even when the F-test
indicated otherwise, Bonferroni's test was used. This test con-
trols the "experimentwise error," which is "the probability of
making at least one error in an experiment when there are no
ii4differences among treatments.
Another procedure was used to detect changes in ratings
given by all banks. The statistical test used here was the
paired-t test, which is appropriate when two population means are
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compared and the observations in each population are dependent on
each other. An example from this study would be ratings given a
particular risk response over time. With the passage of time,
risk response may be different from that of the previous period;
the same bankers were rating the response so the populations were
dependent or related.
A final analytical procedure was used to determine how re-
quirements for financial statements changed over time. This
statistical analysis was the chi-square test for goodnes of fit.
This test compared the actual and average number of observations
for each time period; statistical significance appeared when
these figures differed.
To summarize, parametric and nonparametr ic tests were used,
as the situations dictated. In some instances, a number of tests
were used to ensure detection of differences which truly existed
and to avoid claiming differences which did not exist. Discern-
ment was necessary in the interpretation of the results of these
statistical tests, which were rather blunt instruments in some
cases where the data were rather messy. The tests selected, how-
ever, were the best measurement instruments available. The
results of the various tests are noted in the next chapter.
SUMMARY
The goal of this study of banking risk was to examine bank-
ers' perceptions of risk and the risk management practices they
use. The empirical study was designed to meet these objectives
through the use of ranking and rating schemes and other types of
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questions. The formulation of the questionnaire required the
clear, precise, and pertinent questions be developed to examine
the topics adequately and encourage complete response. A survey
of all Kansas banks was deemed to be the most appropriate method
of data collection. Several statistical analyses -- both para-
metric and nonparametric -- were used to analyze the data and
evaluate the results.
FOOTNOTES
*W. J. Conover, Pract ica 1 Nonparametric Statistics (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), p. 265.
2 Ibid.
, p. 269.
George A. Milliken and Dallas E. Johnson, Analysis of Messy






RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the results of the survey of Kansas
bankers on risk perceptions, risk measurement, and risk manage-
ment. Response to the survey and results of the survey for all
banks are reviewed first. These results are followed by the
results of comparisons of banks differing in size, geographic
location, management experience, and current CAMEL rating. Sig-
nificant trends in bank performance and operations, and signifi-
cant differences among groups of banks are discussed.
NATURE OF SURVEY RESPONSE
The final response rate to the survey was 15 percent. Nine-
ty-two usable responses were received from the 615 questionnaires
mailed on August 27, 1985. Approximately one-third of the re-
sponses received were returned within the first ten days; a small
steady flow continued throughout the month of September. A
follow-up letter was mailed on October 4, 1985, extending the
response deadline to October 15; approximately a dozen more
responses were received during the extended response period.
One major reason for the low response is believed to be the
length of the questionnaire. While pre-tests indicated that it
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was not extremely time-consuming to complete, it still had the
appearance of being a long, difficult form. A few bankers also
commented that the questionnaire was difficult to complete.
There was missing data on almost every question since not every
banker completed every question. The level of response to each
question will be noted when it appears to be sufficiently low.
Response was more than adequate for statistical analyses on
nearly all questions.
RESPONSE FROM ALL BANKS
Bank characterist ics . Total assets for the 92 banks aver-
aged 40.6 million dollars but ranged from 3.7 million dollars to
425 million dollars; the median response was 26.2 million dollars
(Table 1). The mean capital/assets ratio was 9.4 percent, while
the median response was 8.85 percent. The mean and median for
the loan/ deposit ratio were, respectively, 52.8 percent and 5 5.3
percent. The mean return on assets was 1.160 percent, and the
median return on assets was 1.165 percent; 8 of the 78 total
responses were negative. Concerning the charter of the banks,
31 were national banks, 10 were state banks and members of the
Federal Reserve, and 49 were state-chartered but not members of
the Federal Reserve. Sixty-nine banks were owned by a holding
company, while 23 were not. Sixty of these holding companies
owned only 1 bank, while 1 company held 7 and another held 8.
Twenty-six banks were part of a "chain" banking system with each
chain controlling an average of 5.2 banks. The 57 Kansas coun-
ties represented were dispersed across the state. The respon-
dents' number of years as a chief executive officer averaged 9.35
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years. However, the median was only 7 years, with 30 bankers
having 3 years experience or less.
TABLE 1
BANK CHARACTERISTICS: AVERAGES FOR ALL RESPONDENTS
Total assets: $ 40,610,436
Capital/asset ratio: 9.40%
Loan/deposit ratio: 52.81%
Rate of return on assets over the twelve month
period from July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985: 1.16%
Bank Charters :
National banks 31
State banks and Federal Reserve System members 10
State banks and Federal Reserve System nonmembers 49
Banks owned by a bank holding company: 69
Average number of banks controlled by
these holding companies: 1.26
Banks not owned by a bank holding company: 23
Banks controlled by groups (families, individuals,
etc.) which have controlling interest in more
than one bank: 26
Average number of banks controlled by these groups: 5.21
Banks not controlled by such groups: 62
Average number of years as a chief executive officer: 9.35
Risk identification . The bankers ranked the six
banking risks according to the risks' impact on the bankers'
decision-making. Each risk's relative importance was considered
over four periods: five years ago, three years ago, today, and
two to three years in the future (Table 2). For all four peri-
ods, credit risk was ranked as the most important risk, and cost
of funds risk was ranked second. The average ranking of credit
risk increased over time from 2.41 five years ago to 1.58 today.
Cost of funds risk received its highest average ranking three
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years ago, a time of very volatile interest rate behavior. Regu-
latory risk may be perceived as more important today by some
bankers because of increasing competition or by what some bankers
perceive as changing or inconsistent bank examiner attitudes.
Investment risk declined in importance over time. Solvency risk
was consistently ranked last. For all periods, the Friedman
tests showed that the risks tended to be ranked differently even
at the .001 significance level.
TABLE 2
RANKING OF BANKING RISKS FOR SELECTED TIME PERIODS












1.59 1 .58 2.05 2.41
4.20 4.17 3.61 3.48
3.68 3.86 3.53 3.33
3.08 3.12 2.65 2.80
4.59 4.67 4.87 4.72
3.75 3.68 4.36 4.39
1 Rankings went from 1 for the most important to 6 for the least
important
.
For the factors determining the ranking of risks today, the
state of the farm economy was rated highest (Table 3). The state
of the general economy and the quality of officers and staff were
also regarded as quite important factors in determining relative
rankings. Volatile interest rates, competitors' activities,
deregulation of interest rates, and changing bank structure were
all regarded as somewhat less important, although none were rated
as unimportant. For three years ago, volatility of interest rates
was rated highest, consistent with the highest average ranking of
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1.13 b 1.7 4b 2.15
1.45 b 1 .86 b 2.06
1.80 b 1.3 l b 1.90
2.11 2.18 b 2.33
1.95 1 .79 b 2.21
1 .40b 1.70 b 1 .88
2.08 b 1.33 b 2.53
TABLE 3
FACTORS INFLUENCING RISK RANKING DECISIONS,
SELECTED TIME PERIODS
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
FACTORS Average ratings 3
State of farm economy
State of general economy
Volatility of interest rates
Activity of competitors
Deregulation of interest on de-
posits (phase-out of Reg Q)
Quality of officers and staff
Changing banking structure laws
a Rating scale : 1) utmost importance ;
a
critical factor
2) important, though not a critical factor
3) some minor relevance; not very important
This rating is statistically different from that of the
previous period at the .05 level of significance.
cost of funds risk. Three years ago the farm economy, the gen-
eral economy, deregulation of interest rates, and officer quality
were clustered together as somewhat important, whi If competition
and banking structure laws were rated as being of less impor-
tance. The ratings for five years ago were lower for every
factor, and the groupings became less clear. The state of the
farm economy was significantly higher in each period. Several
banks mentioned in the "other" category that changing and incon-
sistent bank examination standards were important considerations
in the evaluation of the rankings of the risks.
The average CAMEL rating, the rating of a bank's overall
health, went from 1.57 five years ago to 1.69 three years ago,
and to 1.96 today (Table 4). The decline from five to three
years ago was not significant at the .05 level, but the decline
from three years ago to today was statistically significant. Of
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TABLE 4
BANKING PERFORMANCE: RATINGS FOR OVERALL CAMEL
AND CAMEL COMPONENTS









1.96 D 1.69 1.57
1.51 1.47 1.55
2.14b 1.89 b 1.75
1 .49 1 .60 1 .60
2.04 1 .82 1.85
1 .38 b 1 .56 1 .61
3 Rating scale: 1 for excellent performance to 5 for poorest
performance
^This rating is statistically different from that of the previous
period at the .05 level of significance.
the five CAMEL components, capital adequacy was basically static,
while asset quality dropped significant ly in each period, falling
from an average of 1.75 five years ago to 2.14 today. Loan
portfolios have deteriorated in quality for many banks during
this time. Ratings of management ability stayed basically the
same over time. The drop in average earnings since three years
was not statistically significant. In the aggregate, banks'
liquidity improved over time.
Risks responsible for changes in bank performance were
ranked similarly to the rankings of the risks' perceived impor-
tance for the future and today (Table 5). Credit risk was
clearly the most important, cost of funds risk second, liquidity
risk and regulatory risk were closely matched, and investment
risk and solvency risk were the least important.
Responses to questions on risk identification and bank per-
formance indicate that banking has become riskier, mainly due to
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TABLE 5
RANKING OF RISKS AFFECTING BANK PERFORMANCE





Cost of funds risk 3.14
Solvency risk 4.20
Regulatory risk 3.95
aRankings went from 1 for the most important to 6 for the least
important
.
the effects of credit risk. The falling CAMEL ratings indicate a
general deterioration in the overall health of many Kansas banks.
Many bankers consider the farm recession a major factor influenc-
ing bank risk exposure today.
Measuring r isk . Several measures were ranked according to
their importance in measuring each of the six risks. For all but
two sets of rankings, the Friedman test indicated that at least
one factor tended to be ranked differently from at least one
other factor at a significance level of .05, and most of the
rankings showed significant differences at the .001 level. The
order of rankings of the measures changed in several risk areas,
showing that risk measurement has changed.
Five measures were ranked according to their importance in
monitoring credit risk over the last five years (Table 6). The
do liar volume of loan losses was ranked first in every period and
grew in relative importance over time. Ninety-day loan delin-
quencies consistently ranked second, but its average ranking













RANKINGS FOR MEASURES OF THE SIX BANKING RISKS
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
MEASURES OF RISK Average rankings
Credit risk " e :
Loan losses: dollar volume
Loan losses: 7. of loans
Loan delinquencies: 30 days
Loan delinquencies: 90 days
Forecasts of business conditions
for your borrowers
laves tment r isk b » G :
Volatility of interest rates
Ratings on securities held
Maturities of securities held
Marketability of securities held
Cash demand (e.g., loan and
withdrawal demand)
Pledging requirements 4.53 4.80 4.75
Liquidity r_isk c * e :
Short term assets/s.t. liabilities 2.94 3.45 3.96
Loan/deposit ratio 3.33 2.97 2.90
Time deposit s/ total deposits 4.18 3.86 3.94
New loan demand 4.33 3.86 3.94
Loan renewals 4.64 4.95 4.65
Volatile deposits 3.46 3.78 4.19
Withdrawal demand 4.80 4.83 4.81
Cost of funds risk • e :
Gaps (RSA - RSL = GAP) 2.78 3.54 4.49
Spreads 1.94 2.22 2.72
Rates paid by competition 3.80 3.32 2.88
Ratio of time and savings deposits 5.12 4.59 4.45
to total deposits
Maturities of time deposits 4.51 4.62 4.33
Projected interest rate changes 4.65 4.58 4.26
Cost of operations 5.04 4.97 4.79
So lvencv risk c :
Loan losses 1.76 2.01 2.17
Loan delinquencies 2.75 2.58 2.66
Capital/asset ratio 2.70 2.53 2.39
General economic conditions 2.89 2.91 2.83
Regulatory r_is_k <* > * :
Regulators' publications & contacts 1.92 2.17 2.26
Industry publications & contacts 2.83 2.79 2.72
Pending federal legislation 2.19 2.01 2.17
Pending state legislation 2.82 2.82 2.90
(continued on the next page)
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TABLE 6 -- Continued
a
-
ankings went from 1 for the most important to 5 for the least
important
.
Rankings went from 1 for the most important to 6 for the least
important
c Rankings went from 1 for the most important to 7 for the least
important
Rankings went from 1 for the most important to 4 for the least
important
e Rankings for all periods showed statistically significant dif-
ferences for all periods at the .05 significance level.
fThe rankings for TODAY and 3 YEARS AGO were not statistically
significant at the .05 level of significance.
loans consistently ranked third. Forecasts of borrowers' busi-
ness conditions and thirty-day loan delinquencies alternated in
the fourth and fifth ranks. Concerning loan losses, the dollar
volume of losses was preferred to losses as a portion of loans.
Concerning delinquencies, ninety days was the preferred length of
time as a measure of credit risk.
Several write-in responses were recorded on credit risk
measurement. Most involved either a ratio including classified
loans or the absolute amount of classified loans; this type of
measure would be somewhat different than either loan losses or
loan delinquencies, although the concepts are similar. No major
shifts in credit risk measurement over time are apparent from
this data.
Changes in investment risk measurement over time do not ap-
pear to be substantial (Table 6). One change concerned the
volatility of interest rates; its average ranking was highest
three years ago at the time of greatest interest rate fluctua-
tion. The mean ranking of maturities stayed relatively constant
over time. Marketability of securities was consistently ranked
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third. Ratings on securities was consistently ranked fourth but
was closely followed by cash demand. Pledging requirements eas-
ily ranked last.
Three groupings appeared among investment risk measures, and
the groupings are consistent with what theory would suggest.
Interest rate volatility and bond maturities are most important,
cash demand and securities' ratings and marketability are some-
what less important, and pledging requirements are relatively
unimportant
.
Changes were also found in liquidity risk measurement. How-
ever, the differences in the rankings showed less significance
than those for any other group of risk measures. The most nota-
ble changes were the rise in importance of the short term as-
sets/short term liabilities ratio and the marginal decline in the
importance of the loan/deposit ratio. Volatile deposits, the
time deposi t s / total deposits ratio, and new loan demand alter-
nated in the middle ranks. Volatile deposits became more impor-
tant, while new loan demand became less important. Loan re-
newals and withdrawal demand were consistently the least impor-
tant measures of liquidity risk. Two notable write-in responses
were "Fed Funds line of credit" and "Federal Reserve line of
credit .
"
Material changes occurred in the measurement of cost of
funds risk (Table 6). Spreads were consistently ranked as the
most important measure, and the average ranking became higher
over time. The greatest change was seen in the importance of
gaps as a measure of risk; gaps moved from the sixth rank to the
second rank over the five-year period. The decline in the
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average ranking of rates paid by competition may be more a
function of the consistently higher rankings of gaps and spreads
rather than a significant decline in the competition for funds.
The other four measures alternated among the remaining positions;
none are becoming more important as measures of cost of funds
risk. Net interest margin, the measure quite similar to spread,
was mentioned once as a write-in response.
Solvency risk measurement saw no major changes over the five
year period. The most important measure in all three periods was
loan losses. The capital /as set ratio always ranked second, but
its average ranking declined over time to where it is not materi-
ally different from loan delinquencies. The influence of general
economic conditions consistently ranked last.
Regulatory risk measures appeared to separate into two
groups (Table 6). The most important group consisted of regula-
tory publications and contacts, and pending federal legislation.
Thus, federal legislation was considered more important than
state legislation, and regulatory contacts were considered more
important than industry contacts.
The six risks were also ranked according to the difficulty
with which they were measured (Table 7). The results were simi-
lar to the rankings of the importance of the risks, but there
were some notable differences. Credit risk was again ranked
first, but not by as wide a margin. Regulatory risk ranked
second, consistent with its rise in importance over time. Cost
of funds risk ranked third, investment risk ranked fourth, and
liquidity risk was ranked only fifth. Solvency risk was
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TABLE 7
DIFFICULTY OF MEASURING RISKS




Liquidity risk 4. 06
Cost of funds risk 3.16
Solvencyrisk 4.38
Regulatory risk 2.63
Rankings went from 1 for the most important to 6 for the least
important
.
considered the least difficult risk to measure.
Some shifts have occurred in risk measurement over time, as
conditions have changed and as measurement tools have been re-
fined. Credit risk seems to be the most important yet most
difficult risk to measure. Measurement of cost of funds risk has
changed over time, as gaps and spreads have grown in importance.
Results also indicate that bankers seem to prefer more direct
measures within the bank to the less direct measures of external
factors (e.g., loan losses and loan delinquencies versus business
forecasts for credit risk, gaps and spreads versus projected
interest rate changes for cost of funds risk, and loan losses
versus general economic conditions for solvency risk). The lat-
ter type of measure would seem to have some value for risk
measurement, but in every case the former type of measure was
clearly preferred.
Risk ma n a g ement * The longest section of the questionnaire
was concerned with risk responses. Eight questions were used to
collect information on the use of and rationale behind various
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risk management practices.
Risk managment practices concerned mainly with credit risk
management were diversification of the loan portfolio, loan pric-
ing, loan insurance, loan guarantees, review of loan policies,
and improving customers' creditworthiness via seminars. The
ratings of every factor climbed through every period; only dif-
ferences for geographic diversification of the loan portfolio
were not statistically different (Table 8). Diversification
among types of loans in the loan portfolio was basically limited
in practice. Charging higher interest rates on riskier loans
increased significantly in use over time, as did the use of loan
insurance and guarantees. The highest rating among credit risk
responses went to the annual review of lending policies. This
TABLE 8
RATINGS OF CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT RESPONSES
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
RISK RESPONSES Average ratings 3
Managing the percentages of the loan 2.13 b 2.37 b 2.49
portfolio in each type of loan
Diversifying the loan portfolio geo- 2.67
graphical ly
Charging higher interest rates on 1.54°
riskier loans
Dse of loan insurance (e.g., crop, 1.59°
hail, and credit life insurance)
Use of guarantee programs (e.g., SBA 1.87°
and FmHA programs)
Annual review of lending policies 1.34°
Giving seminars to improve cus- 2.54 D
tomers' creditworthiness
a Rating scale: 1) extensive use
2) limited use
3} not used
This rating is statistically different from that of the








practice went from moderate use five years ago to extensive use
today. Overall, it appears that several practices are being used
more extensively today.
Several cost of funds risk management practices also re-
flected a trend for all practices to receive more extensive use
today (Table 9). The use of variable rate loans changed from
very limited use five years ago to much more extensive use today.
Gap management experienced an even greater jump and has rela-
tively extensive use today. Hedging with financial futures con-
tracts was almost nonexistent in all three time periods. Making
weekly changes in rates offered on certificates of deposit in
response to changes in national money market rates increased
TABLE 9
RATINGS OF COST OF FUNDS RISK MANAGEMENT RESPONSES
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
RISK RESPONSES Average ratings 3
Using variable rate loans with fixed 1.88* 2.30b 2.64
maturities & variable payment size
Using variable rate loans with fixed 2 . 1 5* 2.45* 2.65
payment size & variable maturities
Gap management 1.57 b 2.09* 2.60
Hedging cost of funds risk with 2.92 2.98 2.97
financial futures
Changing CD interest rates weekly in 1 .24* 1.61* 2.13
response to changes in national
money market rates
Adjusting service fees to match the 1.64* 1.94* 2.35
costs of these services
Basing interest rate changes on rates 2.12 2.08 2.09
charged or paid by competitors





This rating was statistically different from that of the
previous period at the .05 level of significance.
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dramatically in use and received the highest rating given any
practice. However, basing interest rate changes strictly on what
competitors offer remained only limited through all time periods.
Adjusting service fees to more accurately reflect the cost of
those services was also rated much higher today than five years
ago. These results indicate adoption of new practices in the
treatment of cost of funds risk.
Participation loans with correspondents, a practice used to
deal with liquidity risk (and other risks, as well) declined
marginally in importance and remained limited in use (Table 10).
Selling loans to other banks controlled by the same owners was
very limited in use, probably because a majority of the banks
were the only banks held by their owners. The use of incentive
or premium programs to attract deposits was another liquidity
TABLE 10
RATINGS OF MANAGEMENT RESPONSES TO LIQUIDITY RISK,
INVESTMENT RISK, AND SOLVENCY RISK
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
RISK RESPONSES Average ratings 3
Participation loans with corres- 2.26° 2.10 2.05
pondent s
Sales of loans to other banks con- 2.61 2.73 2.80
trolled by your bank's owners
Specifying percentages of inves 1.78'' 1.89'' 2.07
ment portfolio to be held in cer-
tain types of securities
Use of incentive/premium programs to 2.81 2.72 2.71
maintain and attract deposits
Limiting dividends to build capital 1 . 7 9^ 1.93 2.01
Rating scale: 1) extensive use
2 ) 1 im i t ed use
3} not used
This rating is significantly different from that of the
previous period at the .05 level of significance.
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risk management tool which was very limited in use over all three
time periods. Specifying the percentages of the investment port-
folio to be held in certain types of securities became more
important as an investment risk management tool although its use
is still moderate. Solvency risk management via limiting divi-
dends also became somewhat more important, although its use does
not appear to be extensive among most banks at this time.
Several general risk management practices were also rated
(Table 11). One such practice was an annual review of staffing
needs. This practice went from moderate use five years ago to
fairly extensive today. Increasing liability insurance on offi-
cers and board members has become more extensive, going from
somewhat limited use five years ago to moderate use today.
TABLE 11
RATINGS OF VARIOUS OTHER RISK MANAGEMENT RESPONSES
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
RISK RESPONSES Average ratings 3
Annual review of staffing needs 1.58b 1 . 7 b 1.95
Annual review of bank's goals and 1.53 1 . 7 8 b 2.05
ob j ect ives
Participation in C.E.O. and officer 1.46 1.53 b 1.67
training seminars and schools
Increasing liability insurance on 1.76b 1.94b 2.19
officers and Board of Directors
Providing financial planning services 2.2 0° 2.46 2.53
for customers
Increasing the number of income cen- 2.20b 2.42 2.52
ters in the bank (adding insurance,
discount brokerage services, etc.)





This rating is statistically different from that of the previous
period at the .05 level of significance.
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Providing financial planning services for customers and increasing
the number of income centers in the bank by adding such services
as insurance and discount brokerage services are both still
limited in use today.
Relevant issues for banks that find their local economies
depressed concern the bank's diversification policy. The first
issue was diversification of the loan portfolio over a broader
trade area. In the aggregate, 43 banks were able to accomplish
loan diversification, while 49 banks were not (Table 12). In
comparing agricultural and nonagr icul t ur al banks, 60 percent (15
banks) of the nonagr icul tural respondents said they could reach
broader markets in lending, while only 42 percent (28 banks) of
agricultural banks could accomplish this. Relative to diversi-
fying deposits, the results were exactly the same in the the
aggregate and almost exactly the same when the agr icul tur al-
nonagricultural distinction was made. The final issue concerning
diversification dealt with the effects of the new multibank
holding company laws. Only 16 banks said they would change their
TABLE 12
RESPONSES TO DIVERSIFICATION ISSUES
TYPE OF BANK:
ISSDES






YES 43 28 15
NO 49 39 10
YES 43 29 14
NO 49 38 11
YES 16 9 7
NO 75 57 18
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emphasis on geographic diversification as a result of the legali-
zation of multibank holding companies, while 75 banks said that
their emphasis would not change. Twenty-eight percent of the
nonagricultural banks said that their emphasis would change,
while only 14 percent of agricultural banks said that they would
adopt new policies here.
Information gathered on the use of participation loans ap-
pears to be inconsistent. The survey questions were intended to
gauge the importance of overline lending in making participation
loans. An average of 38.6 percent of the number of participation
loans were overline loans, while 39.6 percent of the dollar
volume of participation loans were overlines. The difference
between these percentages was expected to be relatively greater
because overline participation loans by nature are larger than
non-overline participation loans. Since 42 banks indicated that
they had no participation loans which were not overlines, the
participation route seems an important response to overline re-
quests .
Table 13 shows rankings on all responses to overline re-
quests and how these have changed over time. The most popular
response was participation with a regular correspondent, al-
though its average ranking declined slightly over time. Referral
to another institution in the area was consistently ranked second
for all three time periods. Participation with another bank
closely held by the bank's owners saw the greatest jump in rank-
ing over time, moving from the fifth and lowest rank five years
ago to the third ranking today. Ab the future ownership in the
banking industry becomes more concentrated, this could continue
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TABLE 13
RANKINGS OF RESPONSES TO OVERLINE REQUESTS AND REASONS
FOR NON-OVERLINE PARTICIPATION LOANS
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
RESPONSES Average rankings 3
Responses to over line requests :
Participation with a regular corres- 1.87 1.60 1.40
pondent
Refer to another institution in area 2.85 2.96 2.93
Refer to another bank closely held 3.49 3.60 3.70
by the owner of your bank
Participation with another bank con- 3.12 3.49 3.74
trolled by the owner of your bank
Denial of all overline requests 3.58 3.59 3.36
Reasons for non-over line part ic ipat ion loans :
To spread out or share credit risk with
another institution: 2.08
For income purposes in a holding company
or "chain" banking setting: 2.54
To improve or maintain the bank's liquidity
situation: 1.50
a Rankings went from 1 for the most important to 5 for the least
impor tant
.
Rankings went from 1 for the most important to 3 for the least
important. Only 26 banks ranked these responses; 42 banks indi-
cated that they had no participation loans which were not
overlines
to grow in popularity. Referral to another bank closely held by
the bank's owners and denial of all overline requests usually
occupied the lowest two ranks. It appears that participation in
overline situations is generally preferred to referring these
customers to other institutions.
Rationale for non-overline participation loans were also
ranked (Table 13). Of the three responses, improving or main-
taining the bank's liquidity position was clearly ranked as most
important. Spreading out credit risk was ranked second, and
income purposes in a holding company or chain banking setting
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was ranked as the least important. Two write-in responses which
each appeared twice were generation of additional profits, and
"town project" types of loans.
Large barriers to the use of financial futures contracts in
cost of funds risk management must exist for Kansas bankers.
Lack of qualified personnel was the highest-ranking response,
followed by riskiness of financial futures trading and then
presence of better risk management alternatives (Table 14). The
fourth, fifth, and sixth ranks were occupied by resistance by the
board of directors, adverse accounting treatment, and resistance
by regulators. The complexity and perceived riskines of finan-
cial futures trading appear to be greater barriers than hesita-
tion on the part of regulators and directors.
TABLE 14
RANKING OF BARRIERS TO USE OF FINANCIAL FUTURES CONTRACTS
IN MANAGING COST OF FUNDS RISK
RESPONSES Average ranking 3
Adverse accounting treatment of futures positions: 4.23
Lack of qualified personnel to implement and manage
a hedging program: 2.22
Riskiness of financial futures trading: 2.67
Presence of reasonably effective, more practical,
and less costly risk management alternatives: 3.21
Resistance by regulators: 4.23
Resistance by Board of Directors: 3.96
aRankings went from 1 for the most important to 6 for the least
important
.
Eighty-six banks responded to the question related to the
use of a basic gap model in cost of funds risk management (Table
15). Twenty banks indicated that they did not calculate gaps for
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any of the three time horizons. Of the 66 banks which calculated
gaps, about two-thirds maintained positive gaps while the remain-
ing one-third maintained negative gaps. This may indicate that
most Kansas bankers expect interest rates to rise or at least
want to be protected if they do.
TABLE 15
MANAGEMENT OF GAPS AND SPREADS
GAP MANAGEMENT: Number of banks having gaps which are:
Positive Negative Not calculated
For a three month horizon: 40 26 20
For a six month horizon: 46 20 20
For a twelve month horizon: 47 19 20
SPREAD MANAGEMENT8 :
Average spread today (74 banks): 4.0731
Average spread 3 years ago (56 banks): 4.51%
Average spread 5 years ago (44 banks): 4.45%
aEight banks indicated they do not calculate a spread today.
Differences in average spreads were not statistically sig-
nificant (Table 15). The average spread for the 74 banks re-
sponding for today was 4.07 percent, while the average spread for
54 banks three years ago was 4.51 percent. The average spread
for the 44 banks responding for 5 years ago was 4.45 percent.
Eight banks indicated that they do not calculate a spread today.
Risk management is becoming more extensive and intensive as
the banking environment changes. Only three of the twenty-five
practices rated became less extensive in use, and only three
others did not become more extensively used in terms of statisti-
cal significance. Cost of funds risk management has progressed,
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in particular, as circumstances have required and as nev risk
management techniques have permitted. It also appears that cer-
tain general or overall risk management techniques are more
commonly practiced today.
Agricultural lending and risk responses . Responding to
risk in the agricultural lending process is quite important for
Kansas banks, given that most of them are predominantly agricul-
tural lenders and that the farm economy is depressed in 1985.
Results from the final section of questions describe the current
state of certain agricultural lending practices and how these
have changed over time.
For the 86 banks responding, agricultural loans averaged
45 percent of the dollar volume of the entire loan portfolio.
The median response was 47 percent, and 67 banks met the Federal
Reserve's definition of an agricultural bank (i.e., they have at
least 25 percent of their loan portfolios in agricultural loans).
The average size of the agricultural loan portfolio was 5.6 mil-
lion dollars, the median response was 4.0 million dollars, and
the largest response was 20 million dollars. The average number
of agricultural lending officers was 2.1 and the median was 2.
Nine banks reported having 4 or more agricultural lending offi-
cers, and 1 bank reported that it had 6 officers in this area.
An average of 3.6 percent of all agricultural loan applications
exceed banks' legal lending limits today. Thirty-one banks indi-
cated that no applications exceeded their lending limits today;
results were similar three and five years ago. The data seem to
indicate that there are many fairly small, agriculturally-ori-
ented banks that are generally able to service their agricultural
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customers .
One response to current agricultural lending conditions cen-
ters on the demand for information from farm borrowers. The
balance sheet was required by all 83 respondents today, with no
significant increase seen in this requirement over time (Table
16). However, statistically significant increases in require-
ments were seen for income statements, cash flow statements, and
Schedule F (the statement of income and expense on farmers'
income tax returns). Almost every bank now requires a cash flow
statement and a statement of income and expenses in addition to
the balance sheet. This held true for both agricultural and
nonagricultural banks. Write-in responses included collateral
and inventory inspection sheets and depreciation schedules.
Thus, more financial information is being demanded from agricul-
tural borrowers today than in the past.
TABLE 16




TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
Number of banks
Schedule F:
All banks 83 76 73
Ag banks 64 58 55
Non-ag banks 19 18 18
All banks 64 29 14
Ag banks 48 19 9
Non-ag banks 16 10 5
All banks 78 24 11
Ag banks 61 19 5
Non-ag banks 11 8 3
All banks 60 11 6
Ag banks 48 7 5
Non-ag banks 12 4 1
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Security requirements -- that is, the portion of the ap-
praised value of an asset which the bank provides with the loan
— changed over the last five years for eight types of agricul-
tural loans (Table 17). For every type of loan, collateral re-
quirements are significantly more conservative today than three
years ago, while differences between requirements three years ago
and five years ago were not significantly different for any type
except farm real estate loans. Banks thus appear to have become
more conservative in their lending as they attempt to safeguard
themselves against agricultural credit risk.
TABLE 17
CHANGING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ON AGRICULTURAL LOANS
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
TYPE OF LOAN Percent of asset value loaned
Farm real estate loans 62.2 % a 70.4 % a 73.1 %
Farm machinery loans (new) 63.8 % a 71.8 % 73.6 %
Farm machinery loans (used 57.3 % a 67.7 % 68.8 %
Crop operating loans 68.6 % a 75.0 % 76.8 %
Cow-calf operation loans 72.0 % a 76.0 % 76.3 I
Cattle and hog feeding loans 70.2 % a 75.7 % 76.7 1
(animals and feed
Cattle and hog feeding loans 77.1 Z a 80.7 % 81.8 %
(animals only)
Hog farrowing operation loans 65.6 % a 74.2 % 72.5 Z
aThis requirement Tsi significant ly different from that of
previous period at the .05 level of significance.
Fifty-five bankers indicated that they accept second mort-
gages on agricultural loans, while twenty-six stated that they
would not accept any security interest beyond a first lien. Many
respondents indicated that this was done as an added security
measure, not as the only security interest.
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There were no statistically significant changes in
maturities for any of the four types of loans surveyed. A wide
variety of responses were received (Table 18). However, a number
of responses were "seasonal" or "according to demand," and thus
not readily quantified. The fact that there was no apparent
pattern of change in the means would seem to indicate that matur-
ities have basically remained unchanged.
TABLE 18
MATURITIES OF AGRICULTURAL LOANS
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
TYPE OF LOAD Number of years to maturity 3
Farm real estate loans 8.53 7.73 9.01
Livestock operating loans 1.12 .98 1.02
Crop operating loans .73 .72 .72
Farm machinery loans 2.67 2.58 2.53
aNo statistical ly significant differences were found in any com-
parisons among periods.
Bankers indicated that they use several intervals for ad-
justing rates on variable rate loans (Table 19). Several bankers
indicated that they changed rates at a number of different time
TABLE 19
INTERVALS FOR CHANGING VARIABLE INTEREST RATES
INTERVAL FOR CHANGE Number of banks 3
When the bank's base/prime rate changes: 38
Monthly: 13
At time of loan maturity: 17
Quarterly: 8
Semi-annually: 8
When national prime rate changes: 3
Some banks indicated more than one choice.
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intervals (e.g., quarterly and semi-annually, as circumstances
warranted), so it is difficult to see one particular time inter-
val that is most popular for adjusting rates. The most popular
response was when the bank's base /prime rate changed, but the
question did not specify an exact time interval for this.
Concerning the quality of agricultural loan portfolios of
all banks, 43 percent of agricultural debt was renewed rather
than repaid 5 years ago, 51 percent was renewed 3 years ago, and
61 percent has been renewed today, a statistically significant
increase over the five-year period. This change seems to indi-
cate a general deterioration in the quality of agricultural loan
portfolios .
One response to deteriorating farm loan quality is the use
of Farmers Home Administration loan guarantees. The portion of
the agricultural loan portfolio guaranteed by Farmers Home aver-
aged 3.18 percent for 82 banks, with 42 banks indicating they had
no guaranteed loans at all. Only 8 banks indicated that at least
10 percent of their farm loan portfolio was guaranteed. However,
51 banks expected that their use of Farmers Home guarantees would
increase in the near future; only 26 banks did not expect their
use of this program to increase. On average, only 2.37 percent
of the agricultural loan portfolios were involved in Farmers
Home's recent debt restructuring program.
Fifty-one bankers indicated that they were willing to sell
farm loans in the secondary market while 33 indicated that they
were not be willing to do so. However, only 15 bankers were able
to make such sales, while 57 said they were unable to do so.
Concerning their reasons for being unwilling or unable, two
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responses were quite common: 41 banks said that they were not
sufficiently familiar with the secondary market, and 46 banks
indicated that there was no apparent demand for farm loans.
Twenty-seven bankers found the paperwork and other complexities
to be excessive, as well. Write-in responses could be summarized
as saying that these banks had no need or desire to sell these
loans
.
In summary, agricultural lending practices appear to have
become more intensive in investigation and more conservative in
assuming credit risk. Informational requirements are much
greater today than in the past. Loan proceeds are typically
smaller today than earlier for a given amount of collateral.
Quality of agricultural loan portfolios, as measured by loan re-
newals, has deteriorated in the last few years. Bankers appear
prepared to take further steps to deal with credit risk — via
loan guarantee programs, for example -- should conditions con-
tinue to worsen.
GROUP COMPARISONS OF BANKS
A closer examination of the data was made to determine how
different types of banks are affected by risk and how bankers
have responded to it. The banks were classified by five vari-
ables: type (agricultural versus nonagr icult ural) , size, region,
management experience, and current overall CAMEL rating. The
practices and performance of these groups were then compared.
Type . Banks were classified as agricultural using the Fed-
eral Reserve's definition: a bank with at least 25 percent of
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its loan portfolio in agricultural loans was considered an agri-
cultural bank. Sixty-seven banks were classified as agricul-
tural, while twenty-five banks were identified as nonagricul-
tural. Agricultural banks and nonagr icul tur al banks appear to
have been affected differently by the changing banking environ-
ment. Some differences also exist between the groups with regard
to their perceptions of risk and a few risk measurement and
management practices.
A noticeable difference was seen in average size of the two
groups. On average, agricultural banks had 3 1.9 million dollars
in assets, while nonagr icul tur al banks averaged 66.6 million
dollars in total assets. Agricultural banks' capital/assets
ratios were marginally higher than their counterparts (9.5 per-
cent to 9.1 percent), as were their loan/deposit ratios (53.5
percent to 51.0 percent). Agricultural banks' average return on
assets was 1.14 percent, while nonagr icultural banks' return
averaged 1.21 percent. Chief executive management experience
averaged 9.9 years for agricultural banks and 7.8 years for
nonagricultural banks. On average, 54.9 percent of agricultural
banks' loans were farm loans, while 10.4 percent of nonagricul-
tural banks' loans were farm loans.
Both groups identified credit risk as the most important
type of risk, and both groups consistently ranked cost of funds
risk second (Table 20). There were, however, significant differ-
ences in the rankings of investment and regulatory risk for the
future and today. Nonagricultural banks considered investment
risk to be relatively more important, while agricultural banks
viewed regulatory risk as relatively more important. Liquidity
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risk and solvency risk were not regarded significantly differ-
ently by the two groups.
TABLE 20
RANKINGS OF RISKS: AGRICULTURAL VERSUS NONAGRI CULTURAL BANKS
FUTURE TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
































































"Rankings went from I for the most important to 6 for the least
important
.
The general health of agricultural banks tended to be poorer
than that of nonagricultural banks (Table 21). The overall CAMEL
ratings for agricultural banks declined from an average of 1.53
five years ago to an average of 2.11 today, while nonagricultural
banks actually improved their average rating from 1.65 to 1.56
over the same period. In examining the five components of the
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Ag 2.11 1 .72 1.53
Non-ag 1 .56 1 .61 1 .65
Ag 1.58 1 .50 1 .48
Non-ag 1 .33 1 .39 1 .73
Ag 2.23 1 .89 1.70
Non-ag 1 .92 1 .88 1.87
Ag 1.58 1 .67 1.63
Non-ag 1 .25 1 .42 1 .52
Ag 2.13 1 .79 1.76
Non-ag 1.79 1 .88 2.04
Ag 1.48 1 .60 1.64
Non-ag 1 .13 1 .46 1.52
TABLE 21
OVERALL CAMEL RATING AND CAMEL COMPONENTS:
AG BANKS VERSUS NON-AG BANKS
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
FACTOR RATED TYPE OF BANK Average ratings 3
Overall CAMELb :
Capital adequacy:
Asse t qual ity
:
Management ability 15 :
Earnings record:
Liquidity position":
a Ratings went from 1 for excellent health to 5 for poorest
health.
b Statistical differences existed betveen the ratings of the two
groups at the .10 level of significance.
the CAMEL rating, every factor was rated lower today for agricul-
tural banks; two factors — management ability and liquidity --
were statistically different at the .10 level. One hypothesis
for these differences considers the nature of agricultural credit
conditions; farmers' poor financial performance may have caused
the performance of agricultural banks to suffer.
There were few significant differences in risk measurement
practices between the groups. One difference was seen in the
measurement of credit risk: in comparison to agricultural
banks, nonagricul tur al banks tended to place relatively more
emphasis on ninety-day delinquencies (Table 22). The differences
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TABLE 22
RANKINGS OF CREDIT RISK MEASURES:
AG BANKS VERSUS NON-AG BANKS
AG NON-AG
MEASURE OF RISK TIME PERIOD Average rankings 8
Loan losses: dollar volume:
Loan losses: Z of loans:
Loan delinquencies: 30 days:
Loan delinquencies: 90 days:
Forecasts of business conditions: Today
Today 2 .16 2..13
3 yrs ago 2 .07 2 .43
5 yrs ago 2 .51 2 .24
Today 3 .18 3 .30
3 yrs ago 3 .09 3 .10
5 yrs ago 3 .22 3 .05
Today 3 .72 3 .48
3 yrs ago 3 .68 3 .19
5 yrs ago 3 .31 3 .29
Today 2 .85 2 .39
3 yrs ago 2 .89 2..29
5 yrs ago 2 .79 2 .24
3 .17 3 .87
3 yrs ago 3 .41 4 .19
5 yrs ago 3 .29 4 .14
aRankings went from 1 for the most important to 5 for the least
important
.
for loan delinquencies were statistically significant at the .10
level for three and five years ago, although the difference was
not significant for today.
The quality of the agricultural loan portfolio as measured
by rate of loan renewal appeared to differ between the two groups
today. Renewals today amounted to 63.9 percent of agricultural
banks' farm loans, compared to 51.2 percent of those for nonagri-
cultural banks, a difference which was statistically significant.
Differences were not significant three and five years ago (Table
23) .
Even though both groups experienced an increase in renewals,
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TABLE 23
FARM LOAN QUALITY AND DIVERSIFICATION OPPORTUNITIES:
AG BANKS VERSUS NON-AG BANKS
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
Percent of farm loans renewed
rather than repaid3 :
Agricultural banks
Nonagr icult ur al banks
Use of loan diversi f ica tiona °
:
Agricultural banks




1 .84 2.13 2.27
Statistical differences existed among the groups at the .10
level of significance for TODAY only.
''Rating scale: 1) extensive use
2) limited use
3) not used
renewals at agricultural banks increased more quickly. This
creates a dilemma for many agricultural banks since they appear
to be unable or unwilling to diversify their loan portfolios.
Agricultural banks indicated that loan diversification received
limited use, while nonagr icultural banks indicated more extensive
use of thia practice (Table 23).
In summary, there appear to be differences between agricul-
tural and nonagricultural banks in the aggregate with regard to
overall health today. Differences in performance do not appear
to be the result of differences in practices, since few differ-
ences existed in risk measurement and management.
Size . All 92 banks were classified by the amount of their
total assets into 1 of 5 categories: Size 1 for banks with less
than 10 million dollars in assets, Size 2 for banks having be-
tween 10 million and 25 million dollars in assets, Size 3 for
those having between 25 million and 50 million dollars in assets,
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Size 4 for banks having between 50 million and 100 million dol-
lars in total assets, and Size 5 for banks having more than 100
million dollars in total assets. The distribution among these
groups showed Size 1 with 13 banks, Size 2 with 29 banks, Size 3
with 31 banks, Size 4 with 14 banks, and Size 5 with 5 banks
(Table 24). Because some of these groups were sufficiently small
in size, statistical analyses were not always reliable. An
interesting pattern developed in several instances where Size 1
banks and Size 4 banks behaved most similarly, even though they
were quite different in size. The proportion of agricultural to
nonagricultural banks declined as size increased -- only one Size
1 bank was nonagricultural, while only one Size 5 bank was agri-
cultural .
TABLE 24
COMPARISON OF BANK CHARACTERISTICS AMONG SIZE GRODPS
SIZE OF BANKS
(in millions of $)
Capital/asset ratio (%)
Loan/deposit ratio ( Z )
Return on assets (%)
Years as CEO
<10 10<25 25<50 50<100 >100
9.5 10.0 9.0 9.2 8.7
50.8 54.1 50.9 54.9 56.5
.73 1.61 1 .08 .96 .82
9.5 11.9 8.8 7.9 7.8
X of all banks 14.2 31.5 33.7
Ag banks in group (%) 92.4 82.8 74.2




There have been few significant differences in bank perform-
ance as measured by the CAMEL ratings (Table 25). The smallest
banks (<$10 million) and $50-100 million banks were rated sig-
nificantly below the other groups three years ago. This
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TABLE 25
COMPARISON OF OVERALL CAMEL RATING AND CAMEL
COMPONENTS AMONG SIZE GROUPS
SIZE OF BANKS: <10 10125 25<50 5O<.100 >100




TODAY 2.08 1.86 2 .10 1.93 1 .40 1.96
3 YRS AGOb 2.10 1 .46 1 .67 2.07 1 .00 1 .69
5 YRS AGO 1 .80 1.46 1 .50 1.92 1 .00 1.57
Capital adequacy:
TODAY 15 2.00 1.29 1,.59 1.46 1 . 40 1.51
3 YRS AGO 2.11 1.43 1 .31 1.50 1 .25 1.47
5 YRS AGO 1.75 1.52 1..37 2.00 1..25 1.55
Asset quality :
TODAY 2.00 2.00 2 .31 2.31 1 .80 2.14
3 YRS AGOb 2.22 1.75 1 .71 2.43 1 .50 1 .89
5 YRS AGOb 1.88 1.78 1 .46 2.42 1..25 1.75
Management ability
TODAY 1 .73 1.50 1 .41 1.46 1 .40 1.49
3 YRS AGOb 2.33 1.50 1 .33 2.00 1 .00 1 .60
5 YRS AGOb 2.13 1.48 1 .39 2.17 1 .00 1.59
Earnings record:
TODAY 2.60 1.78 2 .10 1 .77 2 .60 2.04
3 YRS AGOb 2.63 1.68 1 .59 2.14 1 .50 1.81
5 YRS AGO 2.71 1.70 1 .64 2.17 1 .75 1.85
Liquidity position
TODAY 1.82 1.36 1 .34 1.23 1 .20 1.38
3 YRS AGO 1 .78 1.57 1 .41 1 .86 1 .00 1 .56
5 YRS AGO 1.63 1.63 1 .50 2.00 1 .00 1.61
"Ratings vent from 1 for excellent health to 5 for poorest
health.
Statistical differences existed among the groups at the .10
level of significance.
difference was not statistically significant today, however. This
pattern of having differences three years ago followed by univer-
sal deterioration is seen in the CAMEL components of asset qual-
ity, management ability, and earnings record, as well. Thus, it
appears that banks of all sizes are now experiencing more
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difficulty .
There appear to be no major differences among the groups in
the measurement of credit risk or cost of funds risk (Table 26).
In measuring credit risk, loan losses became less important and
delinquencies became more important as bank size decreased. For
cost of funds risk, the use of gaps as a measure was ranked much
higher by >$100 million banks, relative to <$10 million banks;
the intermediate groups ranked this factor second consistently.
TABLE 26
COMPARISON OF CREDIT RISK AND COST OF FDNDS RISK
MEASUREMENT AMONG SIZE GROUPS
SIz'eOFBANKS <10 10<25 25<50 50<100 MOO ALL
(in millions of $)
MEASURES OF RISK Average rankings for TODAY












Rates paid by com-
petition: 3.92 3.62 3.88 3.71 4.67 3.80







rate change s :
Operating costs:
"Sinkings went from 1 for the most important to 5 for the least
important
.













































4.58 5.07 5.31 4.93 6.00 5.12
3.83 4.52 4.62 4.71 5.00 4.51
4.50 4.79 4.69 4.50 3.67 4.65
4.82 5.24 5.04 4.92 4.33 4.79
No statistically significant differences appeared in spreads
or the use of gaps in cost of funds risk management (Table 27).
The range of spreads among the groups narrowed over time. The
upper limits of these ranges declined over time, as well.
Spreads for the 5 groups ranged from 5.3 percent to 3.6 percent 5
years ago, while they ranged from 4.4 percent to 3.8 percent
today. The smallest banks had the smallest spreads in every
period, which seems contrary to the notion that these small banks
attempt to maintain wider spreads in lieu of more complicated
management techniques like gap management. The use of gap
management did differ among the groups although the differences
were not statistically significant. The use of gaps today varied
almost precisely with size, with smaller banks showing only
limited use and the largest banks showing much more extensive
use. Adoption of gap management procedures appears to be
TABLE 27
COMPARISON OF COST OF FUNDS MANAGEMENT:
GAPS AND SPREADS AMONG SIZE GROUPS
SIZE OF BANKS <10 10<25 25<50 50<100 >100 ALL
( in millions of $)
a bUse of gaps :
TODAY 1.92 1.64 1.43 1.50 1.40 1.57
3 YRS AGO 2.33 2.04 2.04 2.29 1.50 2.09
5 YRS AGO 2.50 2.64 2.54 2.67 2.75 2.60
Spreads : (in %
)
TODAY 3.82 3.97 4.34 3.92 4.27 4.07
3 YRS AGO 3.96 4.81 4.61 4.06 4.43 4.51
5 YRS AGO 3.55 4.42 4.45 5.26 3.98 4.45
aRating scale : 1) extensive use
2) limited use
3) not used
No statistical differences were found among the groups at the
.10 level of significance.
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spreading in all size groups, however.
The quality of the agricultural loan portfolios as measured
by renewal rate declined for all groups over the five year period
(Table 28). Although the differences appear to be sizable, none
was statistically significant. The <$10 million banks, the most
predominantly agricultural group, had the highest renewal rate as
renewals climbed from 51 percent of their farm loan portfolios 5
years ago to 73.8 percent today. The >$100 million banks experi-
enced a very large increase in renewals, which went from only 19
percent in 1980 to 66 percent today. Poorer agricultural credit
conditions have reached even the largest Kansas banks today,
although these conditions do not pose nearly the same threat to
the large banks as they do to the small banks.
TABLE 28
COMPARISON OF QUALITY OF AGRICULTURAL LOAN
PORTFOLIOS AMONG SIZE GROUPS
SIZE OF BANKS <10 1 <2 5 25<50 50<100 >100 ALL
( in millions of S)




a No statistical differences were found among the groups at the
.10 level of significance.
In summary, it appears that performance has deteriorated for
banks of all sizes. While the importance of agricultural lending
clearly declined as bank size increased, bank performance did not
consistently improve as size increased. The largest banks con-
tinued to show the best ratings, although their performance has
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73.8 64.1 56.7 52.3 66.3 61.0
57.1 56.2 46 .3 46.8 36.5 50.9
50.8 49.0 38.6 37.2 19.0 43 .0
worsened over time. No statistically significant differences
were found in important areas of risk measurement or management.
Region
. Banks were classified into regions using the Kansas
Bankers Association regional boundaries (Figure 1), Eight banks
were located in the smallest region, Region 1, 16 banks were
located in Region 2, another 16 banks were located in Region 3,
11 banks were located in Region 4, 18 banks were located in
Region 5, and 16 banks were located in Region 6. Fifty-seven out
of 105 total counties were represented, with fairly even distri-
bution of respondents among the regions. There were only a few
statistically significant differences in variables as region
varied.
No statistically significant differences were found between
the regions according to bank size, although the mean sizes for
the various regions were spread over a sizable range (Table 29).
At the upper extreme, the 11 banks in Region 4 averaged 61.8
million dollars in total assets, while at the lower extreme the
18 banks in Region 5 averaged only 24.8 million dollars in as-
sets. Region 2 banks and Region 6 banks were the other two
smal le s t-
8
ized groups in terms of total assets.
TABLE 29













The three regions having, on average, the smallest banks
were rated as having more problems as reflected in significant
differences in CAMEL ratings among the regions (Table 30). The
distinction between the three regions having the largest banks,
on average, and the three regions having the smallest banks
TABLE 30
OVERALL CAMEL RATING AND CAMEL COMPONENTS:
COMPARISONS AMONG REGIONS
REGION: 1 2 3 4 5 6





































































































































Ratings went from 1 for excellent health to 5 for poorest
health.
Statistical differences were found among the groups at the .10
level of significance.
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occurred again in the ratings of three CAMEL components -- asset
quality, management ability, and earnings record. The pattern is
slightly different but still apparent for capital adequacy and
liquidity. However, only differences for asset quality were
statistically significant.
Decline in quality of the agricultural loan portfolio
roughly parallels the conditions seen above (Table 31).
Material increases in renewals occurred in all regions, however,
so the problems do not appear to be limited to only a few regions
of the state. Both Regions 2 and 5 consistently showed the
highest levels of renewals. However, while there appeared to be
some tendencies for differences among the groups, none of these
differences was statistically significant. Diversification in
TABLE 31
PROPORTION IN FARM LOANS, FARM LOAN RENEWALS,
AND LENDING DIVERSIFICATION: COMPARISON AMONG REGIONS^
REGION: 12 3 4 5 6
Farm loans/ ._ „










3 YRS AGO 2.13
5 YRS AGO 2.13
65.7 72.3 53.5 43.7
53.3 61 .3 45 .0 33 .1




2 .13 2..00 1 ,81 2 .41 2 .25
2 .62 2 .21 2 .00 2 .60 2 .38
2 .83 2..50 2 ,13 2 .67 2,.1*1
Statistical differences were found among the groups at the .10
level of significance.




lending was used less by bankers in Regions 2, 5, and 6, which
again indicates that these banks will continue to be dependent
upon agriculture while that industry is depressed.
In summary, it appears that performance has been somewhat
weaker in regions with greater concentrations of smaller, agri-
cultural banks. These banks' earnings and asset quality tend to
be weaker, and they appear to have fewer viable lending alterna-
tives while farm credit conditions are poor. Overall perform-
ance appears to have declined somewhat for banks in all regions,
however
.
Management . Comparisons among groups of banks differing
according to management experience placed more focus on differ-
ences in risk measurement and management than on bank perform-
ance. Only the three highest-ranked measures for each type of
risk were compared for differences among the groups. Compari-
sons were made only for the current time period, since 21 of the
88 bankers involved indicated that they had 2 or less years
experience as chief executive officers. The 88 respondents were
classified into 4 categories: Group 1 for bankers with 3 or
less years of experience, Group 2 for bankers having 4 to 7
years of experience, Group 3 for bankers with 8 to 10 years
experience, and Group 4 for bankers with 11 or more years of
experience as chief executive officers. Thirty bankers com-
prised Group 1, 18 bankers were in Group 2, 9 bankers were in
Group 3, and 31 bankers made up Group 4. There was another
curious pattern of behavior in that Groups 1 and 4 were often
similar in behavior even though they differed most in experi-
ence. Several statistically significant differences were found
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in the perceptions and practices of the groups.
Bank performance did not differ significantly between the
groups in the current period. The overall CAMEL ratings were
clustered around the average for all banks, with Group 4 (>. 1
1
years) having the lowest average at 2.03 and Group 1 (O years)
having the highest average at 1.85 (Table 32). Of the five CAMEL
components, four — capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings
record, and liquidity position -- showed no statistically signif-
icant differences. A significant difference was found in the
rating of management ability, where Group 4 (>.l 1 years) bankers
were rated significantly below the rest. On the other CAMEL
factors, Group 4 bankers also tended to be rated lower, but there
appeared to be no substantial "cumulative effect" of this trend
in the overall CAMEL ratings.
TABLE 3 2
OVERALL CAMEL RATING AND CAMEL COMPONENTS:
COMPARISONS AMONG MANAGEMENT GROUPS
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE: <3 4-7 8-10 > 1 1 ALL
FACTOR RATED Average rating for TODAY
1.85 2.00 2.00 2.03 1.96
1.51
2.14






Liquidity position 1.41 1.11 1.44 1.50
1.41 1 .61 1.56 1.53
2.16 2.00 2.00 2.30
1 . . .
2.07 1.89 2.11 2.07
.
2.04
"Ratings went from 1 for excellent health to 5 for poorest
health.
Statistical differences were found among the groups at the .10
level of significance.
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Only one material difference in perceptions of risk appeared
among the groups. Group 4 (Ml years) perceived regulatory risk
as being relatively more important both in the future and today.
The rankings of regulatory risk by Group 4 were much higher in
these two periods than they were for three and five years ago
(Table 33). Group 4 ranked regulatory risk higher and higher over
time, while Groups 2 (4-7 years) and 3 (8-10 years) did not
follow this pattern; in fact, Group 3 perceived regulatory risk
as becoming relatively less important over time. One hypothesis
for explaining changing attitudes toward regulatory risk con-
siders perceived changes in examination attitudes, particularly
toward classification of agricultural loans. However, this does
not appear to be a valid reason for these differences because
there do not appear to be differences among the management groups
with respect to size and type of clientele.
TABLE 33
RANKING OF REGULATORY RISK: COMPARISON OF MANAGEMENT GROUPS
4.00 4.06 4.56 3.06 3.75
3.82 4.17 4.11 3.13 3.68
4.81 4.39 4.00 4.06 4.36
4.67 4.22 3 .88 4.40 4.39
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE: <3 4-7 8-10 > 1 1 ALL





a Rankings went from 1 for the most important to 6 for the least
important
.
Statistical differences were found among the groups at the .10
level of significance.
The top three measures of credit risk were the dollar volume
of loan losses, ninety-day loan delinquencies, and loan losses as
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a portion of all loans. None of these factors showed any statis-
tically significant differences in rankings among the groups when
measured at the .10 level of significance (Table 34). Group 1
(<3 years) bankers tended to rank delinquencies as a relatively
more important measure, although the dollar volume of loan losses
was still their most important measure.
TABLE 34
RANKINGS OF MEASURES OF CREDIT RISK:
COMPARISONS AMONG MANAGEMENT GROUPS
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE: <3 4-7 8-10 > 1 1 ALL
MEASURE OF RISK3 Average rankings for T0DAYb
Loan losses:
dollar volume 2.31 1.88 2.00 2.17 2.15
Z of loans 3.31 3.06 3.11 3.23 3.21
Loan delinquencies:
90 days 2.38 3.06 2.78 2.90 2.73
aNo statistical differences were found among the groups at the
.10 level of significance.
bRankings went from 1 for the most important to 5 for the least
important
.
The top three measures of investment risk showed one statis-
tically significant difference in rankings between the groups
(Table 35). Group 4 (>.ll years) bankers viewed volatility of
interest rates as being relatively less important, compared to
the other groups. Group 3 (8-10 years) was the outlier in the
ranking of investments' maturities, as these bankers viewed this
measure with less regard. There was a wide range of views with




RANKING OF MEASURES OF INVESTMENT RISK:
COMPARISON AMONG MANAGEMENT GROUPS
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE: <3 4-7 8-10 > 1 1 ALL






2.06 2.25 2.25 2.93 2.41
2.73 2.31 3.38 2.55 2.69
3.91 3.25 3.88 3.03 3.49








Statist cal differences were found among the groups at the .10
The four management groups viewed measures of cost of funds
risk differently (Table 36). Each group ranked spreads as the
most important measure today, but Group 3 (8-10 years) bankers
were significantly different in ranking the rates paid by compet-
itors as more important than gaps. One hypothesis for these
TABLE 36
RANKING OF MEASURE OF COST OF FUNDS RISK:
COMPARISONS AMONG MANAGEMENT GROUPS
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE: <3 4-7 8-10 >1 1 ALL
MEASURE OF RISK Average rankings for T0DAYa
Gaps b 2.88 2.00 4.00 2.76 2.78
Spreads 1.97 1.75 2.13 1.97 1.94
Rates paid by competitionb 3.67 4.25 2.63 4.03 3.80
"Rankings went from 1 for the most important to 7 for the least
important
.
Statistical differences were found among the groups at the .10
level of significance.
differences considers the smaller size of Group 3 banks. Gap
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management seems to find more extensive use as bank size in-
creases; Group 3 banks averaged only 27.4 million dollars in
assets, so their smaller size may be at least part of the expla-
nation for these differences.
One significant difference in measurement of regulatory risk
vas found. Group 4 (_>11 years) bankers ranked regulatory publi-
cations and contacts much higher, on average, than did the other
groups (Table 37). This same group viewed regulatory risk as
being relatively more important than the other groups.
TABLE 37
RANKING OF MEASURES OF REGULATORY RISK:
COMPARISONS AMONG MANAGEMENT GROUPS
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE: <3 4-7 8-10 >.l 1 ALL





2.21 2.00 2.13 1.48 1.92
2.16 1.94 2.50 2.29 2.19





" s were found among the groups at the .10
No material differences were found between the groups in the
measurement of liquidity risk and solvency risk.
Attitudes toward monitoring credit and regulatory risk were
also different. Bankers in Groups 1 (<3 years) and 4 (M 1 years)
perceived credit risk as less difficult to measure, in comparison
to bankers in Groups 2 (4-7 years) and 3 (8-10 years) (Table 38).
Groups 1 and 4 placed relatively greater emphasis on regulatory
risk and its measurement.
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TABLE 38
DIFFICULTY IN MEASURING RISKS:
COMPARISONS AMONG MANAGEMENT GROUPS
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE: <3 4-7 8-10 >1
1
ALL
TYPE OF RISK 3 Average rankings^
Credit risk 2.67 1.53 2.25 2.45 2.34
Regulatory risk 2.19 3.4T 3.88 2.33 2.63
a Statisical differences were found among the groups for both
risks at the .10 level of significance.
b Rankings went from 1 for the most important to 6 for the least
imp or t an t
.
No significant differences were found in the practices of
pricing certificates of deposits weekly, limiting dividends to
build capital, annually reviewing lending and investment policies
and annually reviewing staffing needs (Table 39). Group 4 (>11
years) bankers, whose banks were generally rated lower, used
limiting dividends more extensively than others. Group 2 (4-7
years) bankers and Group 3 (8-10 years) bankers were quite dif-
ferent in their use of annual reviews of goals and annual reviews
TABLE 3 9
RATINGS OF VARIOUS RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES:
COMPARISON AMONG MANAGEMENT GROUPS
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE: £3 4-7 8-10 >.1 1 ALL
RISK RESPONSE* Average ratings for TODAY 3
Pricing CD's weekly
Review of lending policy
Review of staffing needs
Review of bank goals
Limiting dividends
3Rating scale: 1) extensive use
2) limited use
3) not used
No statistical differences appeared among the groups at the .10
level of significance.
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1.15 1 .28 1.11 1 .37 1.24
1 .39 1 .33 1.44 1.27 1.34
1.61 1.39 1.67 1.63 1.58
1 .48 1 .33 1 .89 1 .60 1 .53
1.85 2.06 1.78 1.57 1.79
of staffing needs. In both cases Group 3 shoved the most limited
use and Group 2 bankers shoved the most extensive use. Reasons
for these differences are not immediately apparent.
Significant differences appeared betveen the groups in their
vievs on barriers to the use of financial futures in hedging cost
of funds risk (Table 40). Lack of qualified personnel vas ranked
much higher, on average, by Group 3 (8-10 years) bankers. Riski-
ness of futures trading vas not ranked significantly differently
by the groups, although Group 3 did rank it lover than all other
groups. There vas a statistically significant difference in the
ranking of presence of better alternatives. Again, Group 3
ranked this much lover, on average, than all other groups; Group
3 bankers also considered resistance by both regulators and their
boards of directors to be more important than the presence of
better alternatives.
TABLE 40
RANKINGS OF BARRIERS TO OSE OF FINANCIAL FUTURES IN
COST OF FUNDS RISK MANAGEMENT: COMPARISON AMONG MANAGEMENT GROUPS
TEARS OF EXPERIENCE: <3 4-7 8-10 £11 ALL
BARRIER TO RESPONSE Average rankings 3
No qualified officers: 2.41 2.71 1.11 2.07 2.22
Riskiness of futures: 2.38 2.76 3.56 2.63 2.67
Better management alter-
natives 1": 3.14 2.94 4.11 3.15 3.21





differences vere found among the groups at the .10
A final difference among the groups appeared in the compar-
ison of the qualities of their agricultural loan portfolios. The
126
average proportion of renewals for the 4 groups were 49.4 percent
for Group 1 (<3 years), 64.0 percent for Group 4 ( >1 1 years),
72.1 percent for Group 3 (8-10 years), and 73.2 percent for Group
2 (4-7 years). Group 1 was obviously the outlier. Group 1 banks
did receive the highest average CAMEL rating among the four
groups, but Group 1 did not lead the other banks in its rating
for asset quality. Groups 2 and 3 had significantly more renew-
als but their asset quality was rated approximately the same.
Thus, the data does not appear to be consistent, or some impor-
tant consideration has been overlooked in explaining these dif-
ferences .
In summary, management experience has proven to be the
source of some differences among banks. One difference was the
differing perspective that most senior bankers had toward regula-
tory risk and its impact upon their banks. The senior group, in
comparison to their more junior comrades, consistently viewed
regulatory risk as being relatively more important and relatively
more difficult to measure. No major differences in bank perform-
ance or risk management practices were found among the four
management groups.
CAMEL rat ing . The final set of comparisons examined
differences in characteristics and practices of banks as their
self-rated current CAMEL rating varied. Twenty-seven banks
indicated a 1 rating, 45 banks indicated a 2 rating, 14 banks
indicated a 3 rating, 3 banks indicated a 4 rating, and 1 bank
indicated a 5 rating. Because so few banks were rated 4 or 5,




1.15 1.45 2.08 2.33 3.00
1.35 2.17 3.23 4.00 2.00
1.15 1 .43 2.15 2.67 1.00
1.36 1.93 2.85 4.67 4.00
1.08 1.48 1.46 2.67 1.00
Differences in the overall CAMEL ratings were consistent
with differences in the five CAMEL components, as significant
differences appeared among the groups for all five components
(Table 41). Two other characteristics were significantly
TABLE 41
CAMEL COMPONENTS: COMPARISONS AMONG GROUPS
BY OVERALL CAMEL RATING
CAMEL GROOP: I 2 3" 4 5






Statistical differences were found among the groups for all five
components at the .10 level of significance.
''Ratings went from 1 for excellent health to 5 for poorest
health.
different among the groups (Table 42). Return on assets varied
consistenly with the overall CAMEL ratings, with the highest-
rated banks having the highest return. In addition, higher-rated
banks typically showed less reliance on agricultural lending.
The differences in total assets and agricultural loan renewal
rates were not statistically significant (Table 42).
Few significant differences were found in preferences for
individual measures of risk, but other interesting trends were
found (Table 43). No statistically significant differences were
found in preferences for the top three measures of credit risk.
128
TABLE 42
BANK CHARACTERISTICS: COMPARISONS AMONG GROUPS
BY OVERALL CAMEL RATING
CAMEL GROUP: 12 3 4 5
Average amounts or rates
Total assets
(in millions of $) 53.1 35.5 39.8 16.2 33.0
Return on assets a U) 1-56 1.16 0.44 -1.24 -1.50
Farm loans/all loans a (%) 31.1 49.8 47.1 49.3 80.0
Ag loan renewal rate (2) 52.1 60.6 73.3 67.5 70.0
"Statistical differences were found among the groups at the .10
level of significance.
However, the range of rankings tended to become wider as CAMEL
rating declined. No measures of investment risk were ranked
significantly differently. One liquidity risk measure, the loan-
/deposit ratio, was ranked significantly differently in a manner
consistent with differences in performance. The highest-rated
banks again had a narrow range of rankings of liquidity risk
measures. Regarding cost of funds risk measurement, there were
no significant differences in the rankings of the top three
measures. All groups ranked spreads as clearly most important,
but the range of rankings for the other measures followed the
same pattern of widening as CAMEL rating declined. This same
pattern was seen in the rankings of measures of solvency risk
and, to a lesser extent, those of regulatory risk.
Differences in ratings for selected risk management
responses do not provide clear reasons for differences in perfor-
mance (Table 44). Ratings of five responses to credit risk were
compared. No significant differences appeared among the groups
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TABLE 43
RANKINGS FOR SELECTED MEASURES OF RISK:
COMPARISONS AMONG GROUPS BY OVERALL CAMEL RATING
CAMEL GROUP: 12 3 4
MEASURES OF RISK Average rankings for TODAY
Credit risk 3 :
Loan losses: $ volume
Loan losses: X of loans
90-day delinquencies
2.60 2.02 1.93 1.00 2.00
3.36 3 .07 3 .43 3 .00 4.00
2.32 2.87 2.79 3.33 3.00
3.48 2.54 3.07 3.67 na
3 .88 3.37 2.86 1 .00 na
3.40 3.66 2.86 1 .00 na
3.28 2.56 2.36 3.67 na
1.88 2.00 2.00 1 .00 na
3.80 3.88 3.57 3.00 na
2.08 1.67 1.64 1.00 1.00
2.40 2 .88 2.71 2.67 3 .00
Volatility of interest
rates: 2.12 2.35 2.93 4.00 na £
Securities' maturities 6 2.96 2.56 2.64 1.00 na
















and contacts 2.04 2.00 1.57 1.00 3.00
Pending federal legis-
lation 2.17 2.12 2.43 2.67 1.00
aRankings went from 1 for the most important to 5 for the least
important
.
Rankings vent from 1 for the most important to 6 for the least
impor tan t
c Rankings went from 1 for the most important to 7 for the least
important
.
Rankings went from 1 for the most important to 4 for the least
important
Statistical differences were found among the groups at the .10
level of significance.
No data were available for the Group 5 bank.
in the ratings for review of lending policies, diversification by
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type of loan, geographic diversification of lending, and loan
insurance. The use of loan guarantees was rated significantly
differently but not in a fashion which would explain differences
in performance. Ratings of other risk responses which showed no
significant differences included those for weekly CD pricing,
specifying amounts to be held in particular types of securities,
and annually reviewing bank goals and objectives. Significant
differences were found in ratings for limiting dividends and
annually reviewing staff needs, but only those for reviewing
staff needs were consistent with patterns of bank performance.
In addition, no significant differences were found among the
TABLE 44
RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: COMPARISONS AMONG GROUPS
BY OVERALL CAMEL RATING
CAMEL GROUP: 12 3 4 5
RISK RESPONSE Average ratings for TODAYA
Review of loan policies 1.30 1.42 1.29 1.00 1.00
Diversification by
loan type 2.11 2.20 1.85 2.50 3.00
Geographic diversifica-
tion of lending
Use of loan insurance




Specifying portion of se-
curity portfolio held in
particular securities
Annually review of goals
SPREAD MANAGEMENT
Size of spread (%) 4.16 3.96 4.19 4.37 5.00
aRating scale : 1) extensive use
2) limited use
3) not used
Statistical differences were found among the groups at the .10
2.68 2.61 2.86 2.50 3.00
1.74 1.55 1.43 1.50 2.00
1.96 1 .82 1.93 1.00 3.00
1 .26 1 .24 1.14 1 .00 1 .00
1.74 2.00 1.36 1.00 2.00
1.30 1.42 1 .29 1 .00 1 .00
1.85 1.76 1.64 2.00 3.00
1.41 1 .69 1 .43 1 .00 1 .00
level of significance.
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groups with respect to the size of spreads.
In summary, differences in bank performance were more clear
than the reasons for these differences. Poor performance was
typically accompanied by greater reliance on agricultural lend-
ing, while differences in size did not seem to account for dif-
ferences in performance. Lower-rated banks tended to have more
clear preferences among measures of risk; their risk measurement
efforts may be focused too narrow ly on just a few measures.
Ratings of selected risk responses did not provide clear indica-
tions of reasons for differences in performance.
SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a review of the results of the
survey presented to Kansas bankers in the autumn of 1985.
Ninety-two banks responded out of a total of 615 total banks sur-
veyed, a response rate of fifteen percent. Information was
collected regarding bank characteristics, bankers' perceptions of
risk, risk measurement practices, and risk management practices.
A special section on risk responses and agricultural lending also
developed information on a topic critical to many Kansas banks
today
.
The results show that bank performance has deteriorated
somewhat over the last five years with the greatest problems
coming in the last three years. The farm recession is an impor-
tant contributing factor to this decline in many bankers' view.
Credit risk is the predominant concern, as asset quality has de-
clined significantly over this time. Regulatory risk has become
more important to many bankers. Cost of funds risk measurement
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and management have changed significantly over time as adoption
of gap management has become more extensive. Management of
almost all risks has become more extensive through wider adoption
and more extensive use of many risk management practices. Agri-
cultural lending practices have also changed. Bankers now re-
quire much more information from their borrowers than earlier,
and security requirements have become more conservative. Agri-
cultural loan portfolios have deteriorated in quality, as meas-
ured by loan renewal rate.
Comparisons of several groupings of banks also pointed out
some trends. It appears that agricultural banks are typically
experiencing greater problems today than nonagr icul t ural banks.
Banks with lower CAMEL ratings tended to have a more narrow focus
in their risk measurement efforts. Larger banks are now begin-
ning to feel the stresses which some smaller banks were experi-
encing earlier. Problems are slightly more concentrated in re-
gions of the state having relatively more small, agricultural





This chapter summarizes the information presented in earlier
chapters. It includes a review of banking risks in light of
changing economic conditions faced by Kansas banks in the last
several years and highlights the study's findings.
SUMMARY OF THE INFORMATION
Risk in banking . Financial intermediaries function in our
economy to bridge the gap between borrowers and savers by effect-
ing the efficient transfer of capital between these two groups.
Differences exist between these two groups with regard to prefer-
ences of size, maturity, marketability, liquidity, and riskiness
of financial claims; financial intermediaries resolve these dif-
ferences by offering each group financial claims suiting their
own preferences. Financial intermediaries specialize in lending
and investment activities and earn profits by spreading their
costs and risks over the large pool of assets with which they
work .
Commercial banks, the most common type of financial inter-
mediary, face risks that may be classified into six general
areas. Credit risk is the risk banks face from potential
delinquency or default by borrowers. Investment risk is the risk
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of capital losses on the sale of securities before maturity.
Liquidity risk is the risk of inadequate funding to continue bank
operations. Cost of funds risk is the risk produced by unantici-
pated changes in banks' cost of funds. Solvency risk is the risk
of bank insolvency, and regulatory risk is the risk of adverse
changes in the regulatory environment. Many interrelationships
exist between these types of risk, and management must coordinate
all aspects of these banking risks to best control total bank
risk exposure.
Events in the banking environment often contribute to banks'
risk exposure, and the banking environment has seen numerous
changes in the last several years. Important deregulatory
changes in this period have included the removal of interest rate
ceilings on deposits, the promotion of greater competition among
financial intermediaries, and for Kansas banks, the authorization
of multibank holding companies. Economic events such as in-
terest rate volatility and general recession in the early 1980's
were also important to banks. The economic event of most in-
terest to the majority of Kansas banks has been the farm reces-
sion which has dragged on through most of the 1980's. All of
these events have contributed to bank risk exposure through di-
rect effects on banks themselves and through indirect effects on
banks' customers.
Results of the survey . A survey was used to gather the data
necessary for the study's analyses. Information was solicited
on the topics of bank characteristics, perceptions of risk,
measures of risk, and responses to risk, particularly in the area
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of agricultural lending. These questions were to determine which
risks bankers perceive as being most important to the success of
their operations, to examine how bankers measure or monitor these
risks, to determine how bankers respond to these risks, and to
examine how all of these factors have changed over time. Ninety-
two of 615 banks responded, a response rate of 15 percent.
The respondent banks were typically small, agriculturally-
oriented banks. Total assets for all banks averaged 40.6
million dollars, with the median at 26.2 million dollars. The
important ratios of loans to deposits and capital to assets
seemed conservative, with average values of 52.8 percent and 9.4
percent, respectively. Return on assets for all banks averaged
1.16 percent. Most banks were owned by holding companies, and
the vast majority of these holding companies controlled only one
bank. Fifty-seven counties were represented in the survey, with
representative responses from all regions of the state. Chief
executive officers averaged 9.4 years of experience in that
position, although one-third of the respondents indicated they
had 3 or less years of experience. Approximately three-fourths
of the banks would be considered agricultural banks, having at
least 25 percent of their loan portfolios in farm loans. The
average portion of farm loans to all loans was 45 percent, with
the median response being 47 percent. There is some diversity
among Kansas banks, but the majority appear to be smaller banks
emphasizing agricultural lending.
Of the six risks considered, credit risk was viewed as the
most important. Credit risk was ranked as most important five
years ago, three years ago, and today, and its relative
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importance has increased in recent years. Cost of funds risk
consistently ranked second, although its highest average ranking
was three years ago. Regulatory risk grew in importance over
time, particularly among agricultural bankers and bankers with
over ten years of management experience. Liquidity risk consis-
tently received an intermediate rank, and investment risk and
solvency risk were typically considered as least important. The
current farm recession received the highest rating today among
all factors considered in explaining the rankings of the risks.
In the aggregate, bank performance as measured by CAMEL
ratings has deteriorated in the last few years. The greatest
deterioration has come in the last three years, with credit risk
ranking as the primary cause of this deterioration. Asset qual-
ity has declined significantly for many banks, and earnings have
suffered, as well. Poor credit conditions appear to have pro-
duced this result. Factors such as capital adequacy, management
ability, and bank liquidity do not appear to be as important in
contributing to this overall decline.
The dollar volume of loan losses was the highest-ranking
measure for credit risk in every period; 90-day delinquencies
consistently ranked second. The bankers viewed credit risk as
the most difficult risk to measure. Measurement of risk changed
most dramatically for cost of funds risk, as adoption of gap
management increased over time. However, spreads are still the
most favored measure of cost of funds risk. Regulatory risk was
ranked as the second most difficult risk to measure, with its
primary measure being the qualitative one of regulatory publica-
137
tions and contacts. Measurement of most risks has not changed
substantially over time, although some changes appear to have
taken place where both the need and the opportunity to change
have existed.
Certain trends are apparent in risk management. Ratings of
nearly all risk responses indicate more intensive management
efforts. Responses to cost of funds risk have changed dramati-
cally over time, as the practices of gap management, variable
rate loans, and weekly deposit pricing have all become much more
extensive. Other general risk responses such as reviews of bank
goals and bank staffing needs have also become much more common.
Responses to credit risk include increased use of annual reviews
of lending policies, use of loan insurance, and loan pricing
discrimination. Diversification of the loan portfolio has been
limited .
Agricultural lending practices have changed during the last
five years as credit conditions have deteriorated. One change
has been the great increase in demand for financial information
from agricultural borrowers; almost all banks now require a
balance sheet, a cash flow statement, and some statement of
income and expense from their farm borrowers. Less money is
being loaned today against a given amount of collateral for every
type of agricultural loan, compared to lending practices of only
three years ago. Use of Farmers Home Administration loan guaran-
tees was limited, but two-thirds of the banks expected their use
of guarantees to increase in the near future.
Five systems of classification were applied to the banks to
determine how different types of banks have performed during this
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period. The five classifications were type of clientele
(agricultural or nonagr icul tur al) , size, region, management ex-
perience, and current CAMEL rating. Interesting differences were
found among groups of banks in each system of classification.
Agricultural banks' performance today is typically poorer
than that of nonagr icul tur al banks. Agricultural banks were typ-
ically smaller and less able to diversify, as compared to nonag-
ricultural banks. Risk measurement and management practices were
not significantly different among the groups, although differ-
ences in performance clearly existed in both overall CAMEL rat-
ings and CAMEL components. Significant differences were also
found in the quality of agricultural loan portfolios today, with
the agricultural banks having higher farm loan renewal rates.
The performance of agricultural banks as a group has signifi-
cantly deteriorated during this decade.
There were some notable differences accompanying differences
in bank size. Significant differences in CAMEL ratings were
detected three years ago, but it now appears that deteriorating
performance is found among banks of all sizes. Smaller banks
were much more likely to be agricultural banks, and the group of
smallest banks typically showed the poorest performance. Differ-
ences in risk management were primarily in the area of cost of
funds risk management, where larger banks place relatively more
emphasis on gap management. Another important difference was
found in the use of lending diversification: only the largest
banks indicated more than just limited use.
Only slight differences in bank performance and operation
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were found among banks in different regions of the state. The
results paralleled those of earlier comparisons in that regions
having typically smaller, more agriculturally-oriented banks
showed somewhat poorer performance. No statistically signifi-
cantly differences in risk measurement or management were found
among the groups, although the regions where agricultural lending
was most concentrated were also the regions where lending diver-
sification was most limited. However, performance was declining
for banks in all regions.
Bank performance did not differ significantly as management
experience varied. Although the group of bankers having the most
experience often received the lowest CAMEL ratings, no statis-
tically significant differences in bank performance appeared as
management experience varied. Managers with the most experience
saw regulatory risk as being much more important than did the
rest of the managers. No outstanding differences in risk meas-
urement were detected among the groups. Similarly, no signifi-
cant differences were found in the ratings of selected risk
management practices.
Banks with CAMEL rating of 1 tended to have less reliance on
agricultural lending, relative to lower-rated banks. Few sig-
nificant differences were found in preferences for individual
measures of risk as CAMEL ratings varied. Lower-rated banks
tended to show more clear preferences for particular measures
withing each group of measurement tools, indicating that their
risk measurement efforts may be focused too narrowly in certain
cases. Ratings of selected risk responses did not provide clear
indications of reasons for differing performance.
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CONCLUSIONS
The goals of this study were to determine which risks bank-
ers perceive as being most important to the success of their op-
erations, to examine how bankers measure or monitor these risks,
to determine how bankers respond to these risks, and to examine
how all of these factors have changed over time.
Credit risk is perceived as the most important risk to Kan-
sas bankers today. The reason for this seems clear: deterio-
rating credit conditions, particularly in agriculture, have re-
duced loan portfolio quality for many banks. This is a serious
trend, considering that the majority of Kansas banks are primar-
ily agricultural lenders. Cost of funds risk was also perceived
as important; the period of volatile interest rates in the early
1980's illustrated the hazards of exposure to this risk. In
recent years regulatory risk has risen the most in importance, as
deregulation and perceived regulatory inconsistency have appeared
to have more significant effects on banks now than in the past.
Still, credit risk must be considered the primary risk and it
will remain so in the near future.
The only major change in risk measurement was seen in that
for cost of funds risk, as gaps and spreads were ranked higher
and higher over the five-year period. Direct measures of risk
were consistently preferred to broader, less direct measures of
risk, presumably because they have more relevant, direct results.
Preferences for individual measures of risk did not differ sig-
nificantly as bank performance varied, but banks with poorer
performance appeared to focus their risk measurement efforts on
fewer measures of risk.
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Management of cost of funds risk saw adjustments as volatile
interest rates created the incentive to change, and gaps,
spreads, and variable rate loans provided the opportunity to
change. Responses to greater credit risk have included more
frequent loan policy reviews, loan insurance, loan guarantees,
and pricing according to riskiness of loans. One notable re-
sponse to credit risk in agricultural lending has been greater
financial informational demands from agricultural borrowers;
also, security requirements for agricultural loans have in-
creased. Use of loan guarantees is expected to increase if
agricultural credit conditions continue to deteriorate. Other
management practices like reviews of bank goals and objectives
and reviews of bank staffing needs are also becoming more fre-
quent .
Bank performance in general has deteriorated over the last
five years, with most changes coming in the last three years.
The principal source of problems for most Kansas banks appears to
be the poor agricultural credit conditions. The recent changes
in certain areas of risk management also indicate that certain
areas of risk management may have been inadequate in light of
changing economic conditions. Some banks' opportunity to diver-
sify their lending is limited, restricting their responses. Ef-
fects of credit problems are beginning to reach even the largest
Kansas banks today, although these problems have not been nearly
as damaging to their performance or threatening to their survival
in comparison to the smaller banks.
The results of this study have certain implications for bank
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customers. For depositors, there appear to be no* major changes.
The current situation of reasonable price competition for depos-
its through a variety of accounts and services should continue.
The trend toward more competitions through new accounts and
services should continue to provide good investment opportunities
and flexible financial services for depositors. The safety of
these deposits should remain well-insured; even though bank fail-
ure has become more frequent in recent years, depositors remain
well-protected through the insurance of all deposits up to 100
thousand dollars, safety of these deposits well-insured.
For borrowers, however, there may be some recognizable
changes as banks exercise greater scrutiny in their lending.
Loan portfolio quality has deteriorated for many banks, and
their tendency will likely be to avoid marginal loans which may
previously have been made. Agricultural borrowers now find
greater demands for financial information from their bankers than
ever before. Farmers may also be expected to provide a greater
portion of the capital for their operations, as bank security
requirements have become more conservative.
The study's results also have certain implications for the
Kansas banking industry. The results indicate that the industry
is in a period of adjustment. Changing economic conditions,
particularly agricultural credit conditions, have produced an
environment where survival is less assured today than in the
past. Deregulation has also spawned greater competition among
banks in some areas, and competition with other firms offering
certain financial services has also increased.
Responses to these changing conditions may vary among banks.
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Agricultural banks with few other lending options are somewhat
restricted in their responses to the farm credit problem; re-
sponses such as greater financial informational demand and col-
lateral requirements, and loan guarantees are options which many
bankers are using or are prepared to use. Still, less risky (and
perhaps less profitable) investment alternatives may necessarily
be sought
.
The very largest banks will probably maintain their rela-
tively stronger performance, although the data has shown that
they are not immune from some of the problems besetting some
smaller banks. Through their own lending, through competition
with other banks and intermediaries, and through correspondent
relationships with troubled banks, these larger banks may experi-
ence more risk exposure in their operations.
Thus, stressed conditions and the need for competent manage-
ment are evident. As economic conditions and financial markets
continue to change, competent risk management will be necessary







KANSAS BANKERS' ANALYSIS OF RISK AND RISK RESPONSE
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Please read each question carefully before answering. Some
questions require "rankings" and others only simple "ratings." Some
ofthequestions examine how conditions have changed overtimeand
require knowledge and experience from three and five years ago.
Answer for only those periods when you were in a decision-making posi-
tion at a commercial bank. For the periods when you were not in that
type of position, indicate "not applicable" ("NA"). There may be
other questions that don't apply to your bank. Indicate "NA" in those
cases, also.
Where specific characteristics (e.g., dollar amounts, ratios,
percentages, etc.) are requested, please respond using information as
of June 30, 1985.
A business reply envelope has been provided to return the form.




2. Capital/asset ratio: *
3. Loan/deposit ratio: *
4. Rate of return on assets over the twelve month
period from July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985: X
The bank is: (check)
a national bank
_
a state bank and a member of the Federal Reserve System
a state bank and not a member of the Federal Reserve System
6. Is the bank owned by a bank holding company? YES NO
If "YES," in how many banks does this holding company have controlling
interest?
Is the bank owned by a group (family, individual, etc.) which has
controlling interest in more than one bank? YES NO
If "YES," how many banks are controlled by this group?
7. County in which the bank is located:
8. How many years have you been a chief executive officer?
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II. IDENTIFYING RISK
9. For purposes of this questionnaire, the following risk classifi-
cations vill he used:
a) CREDIT RISK — potential delinquency or default by borrowers;
b) INVESTMENT RISK — capital losses on securities sold before
maturity;
c) LIQUIDITY RISK — volatile deposits and other demands for funds;
d) COST OF FUNDS RISK — unanticipated changes in the cost of funds;
e) SOLVENCY RISK — financial institution's high financial leverage;
f) REGULATORY RISK — unanticipated changes in the regulatory
environment.
Please rank these risks and other risks not mentioned according to
their impact on your decision making. Rank these risks according to
your perception of their impact 5 YRS AGO, 3 YRS AGO, TODAY, and what
you expect two to three years in the FUTURE (in each time period, give
the greatest risk a "1", the second greatest risk a "2", and so on).











10. Below is a list of factors which may help explain the relative impor-
tance you gave each risk in the rankings above; you should also list
factors you feel are important which aren't mentioned here. How im-
portant were each of these factors for TODAY'S rating? for the rating
3 YRS AGO? for 5 YRS AGO? Use these ratings to show the importance
of each factor.
1) utmost importance; a critical factor
2) important, though not critical
3) some minor relevance; not very important
FACTORS TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
State of farm economy
State of general economy
Volatility of interest rates
Activity of competitors
Deregulation of interest on deposits
(phase-out of Regulation Q)
Quality of officers and staff








11. Bank examiners generally evaluate a bank's general "health" by
determining 1) capital adequacy, 2) asset quality, 3) management
ability, 4) earnings record and potential, and 5) liquidity position.
On a scale of 1 to 5 ("1" = excellent health, "5" - bank subject to
closure)
,
please rate the overall condition of your bank (circle).
TODAY 12 3 4 5
3 YRS AGO 12 3 4 5
5 YRS AGO 12 3 4 5
12. Of the risks listed on question 9, which one(s) resulted in any
change in your most recent overall rating? Rank the risks most re-
sponsible for any change (let "1" be the risk most responsible for










other (as specified on #9):
_
other (as specified on #9):
13. Please rate the "health" of each of the factors evaluated by
examiners: (circle)
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YSS AGO
Capital adequacy 12 3 4 5 12 3 4 5 12 3 4 5
Asset quality 12 3 4 5 12 3 4 5 12 3 4 5
Management ability 12 3 4 5 12 3 4 5 12 3 4 5
Earnings record 12 3 4 5 12 3 4 5 12 3 4 5
Liquidity position 12 3 4 5 12 3 4 5 12 3 4 5
III. MEASURES OF RISK
14. For each type of risk, please rank the measures or indica-
tors used to monitor the risk. Mention and rank any other indicators
you use which are not given on the lists here. (Let "1" be the most
important measure of risk, "2" the second most important measure, and
so on; use "NA" for measures you do not use.)
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
a) Credit risk :
Loan losses: dollar volume
Loan losses: Z of loans
Loan delinquencies: 30 days
Loan delinquencies: 90 days






(THIS QUESTION IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
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Measures of Risk (cont'd): for each type of risk, please rank the
measures used to monitor the risk; use "NA" for measures not used.
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
b) Investment risk :
Volatility of interest rates
Ratings on securities held
Maturities of securities held
Marketability of securities held
Cash demand (e.g., loan and withdrawal







c) Liquidity risk :
Ratio of short term assets to short
term liabilities
Loan/deposit ratio
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assets and interest-sensitve liabilities
for a certain maturity length)
Spreads
(spread between cost of funds and
earnings rate)
Rates paid by competition
Ratio of time and savings deposits to
total deposits
Maturities of time deposits










(THIS QUESTION IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
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Measures of Risk (cont'd): for each type of risk, please rank the
measures used to monitor the risk; use "NA" for measures not used.
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO




General economic conditions (inasmuch






f ) Regulatory risk :
Regulators' publications and contacts









15. Even though several indicators for each risk may be used, detec-
tion of risk may still be unsatisfactory. Please rank the different
types of risk according to the difficulty with which they are moni-
tored. (Let "1" represent the risk most difficult to monitor, "2" the





Cost of funds risk
Solvency risk
Regulatory risk
Other (as specified on #9)
Other (as specified on #9)
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IV. RISK RESPONSES
16. Please rate each of these responses according to the degree of use




TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
Participation loans with correspondents
Sales of loans to other banks controlled
by your bank's owners
Managing the percentages of the loan
portfolio in each type of loan
(i.e., agricultural, installment,
commercial, etc.)
Diversifying the loan portfolio geo-
graphically (lending outside your
normal market area)
Specifying percentages of the investment
portfolio to be held in certain types
of securities
Charging higher interest rates on
riskier loans
Use of loan insurance (e.g., crop, hail,
and credit life insurance)
Use of guarantee programs (e.g., SBA and
FmHA programs)
Using variable rate loans with fixed
maturities and variable payment size
Using variable rate loans with fixed
payment size and variable maturities
Matching maturities of assets and liabil-
ities (gap management)
Hedging cost of funds risk with finan-
cial futures
Changing CD interest rates weekly in re-
spouse to changes in national money
market rates
Adjusting service fees to match the
costs of these services
Use of incentive/premium programs to
maintain and attract deposits
Basing interest rate changes on rates
charged or paid by competitors
Limiting dividends to build capital
Annual review of bank's investment and
lending policies
Annual review of staffing needs
Annual review of bank's goals and ob-
jectives
Participation in C.E.O. and officer
training seminars and schools
Increasing liability insurance on of-
ficers and members of Board of Directors
(THIS QUESTION IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
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16. Risk Responses (cont'd): rate each of these responses according
to their degree of use.
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
Giving seminars for customers to improve
their creditworthiness
Providing financial planning services
for customers
Increasing the number of income centers
in the bank (adding insurance, discount
brokerage services, etc.)
17. Concerning diversification, can your institution reach broader
markets by:
a) making additional types of loans to diversify your loan port-
folio? YES N0
b) attracting additional of types of depositors to diversify your
liabilities? ™S HO
Will the new multi-bank holding company laws change your institution
emphasis on geographic diversification? YES NO
18. An overline request is a loan request which seeks an amount in
excess of the bank's legal lending limits, while a participation loan
situation involves two or more institutions in the funding and ser-
vicing of that loan.
What percentage of the number of participation loans are overline
loans at your bank? X
What percentage of the total dollar volume of participation loans
are overline loans? Z
19. For each time period, rank your bank's responses to overline re-
quests, including responses not mentioned here (with "1" being the
most favored, "2" the next best response, etc.; use "NA" for any re-
sponses not used).
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO
Participation with a regular corres- ;
pondent
Referral to another institution in area
Referral to another bank closely held
by the owner of your bank
Participation with another bank closely ^___
held by the owner of your bank






20. For what reasons do you make participation loans which are not
overline requests? Rank these reasons according to their importance
to you; also, list and rank any factors not mentioned on this list
which you feel are important (Let "1" be the most important reason,
"2" the next most important, and so on.).
To spread out or share credit risk with another institution
For income purposes in a holding company or "chain" banking
setting
To improve or maintain the bank's liquidity situation
Other (specify):
Other (specify):
Not applicable — we have no participation loans which are not
overlines
21. What do you see as barriers to your usage of financial futures to
hedge cost of funds risk? Rank these factors (and any others you feel
are important) according to their impact on your decision to use
futures, with "1" being the greatest barrier, "2" being the next
greatest barrier, and so on.
Adverse accounting treatment of futures positions
Lack of qualified personnel to implement and manage a hedging pro-
gram
Riskiness of financial futures trading
Presence of reasonably effective, more practical, and less costly
risk management alternatives (e.g., matching maturities)
Resistance by regulators
Resistance by Board of Directors
Other (specify):
22. A measure called a "gap" is the difference between the bank's
rate-sensitive assets and its rate-sensitive liabilities (RSA - RSL =
GAP). When interest-sensitive assets are greater than interest-sensi-
tive liabilities, then the gap is said to be positive; when the in-
terest-sensitive liabilities are greater, the gap is said to be nega-
tive. Indicate whether your gap is positive, negative, or not calcu-
lated (circle).
For a three month horizon, your gap is: + - not calculated
For a six month horizon, your gap is: + - not calculated
For a twelve month horizon, your gap is: + - not calculated
23. A measure called a "spread" is the difference between the weighted
average return realized on interest-earning assets and the weighted
average cost of funds. How does your spread today compare with what







V. THE AGRICULTURAL LENDING FUNCTION AND RISK RESPONSES
24. What percentage of your loan portfolio is in agricultural loans?
Z
25. What is the dollar vo lume of your agricultural loan portfolio?
$
26. How many officers at your bank have their primary responsibility
in the agricultural lending function?
27. What percentage of the number of agricultural loan applications at
your institution exceed your legal lending limits?
TODAY: %
3 YRS AGO: Z
5 YRS AGO: X
28. What types of financial statements do you require from your agri-
cultural borrowers? Check the ones you require TODAY, and the ones
you required 3 YRS AGO and 5 YRS AGO.







29. What are your general rules for security requirements (that is,
the portion of the appraised value of an asset you loan) for these
different types of loans? What were the security requirements 3 YRS
AGO and 5 YRS AGO?
TODAY
Farm real estate loans
Farm machinery loans (new)
Farm machinery loans (used)
Crop operating loans
Cow-calf operation loans
Cattle and hog feeding loans (animals
and feed)
Cattle and hog feeding loans (animals
only)











30. Do you accept a security interest beyond a first lien (that
do you accept second mortgages) for agricultural loans?
YES NO
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31. How have maturities changed over the last five years? For each
type of loan, what were the average maturities? Write in the average
maturity (e.g., six months, one year, five years, etc.) for each type
of loan in each time period.
TODAY 3 YRS AGO 5 YRS AGO




32. How often do you change interest rates on variable rate loans?
_
When the bank's base/prime rate changes
Monthly
At time of loan maturity
Other (specify):
33. In terms of dollar volume , what percentage of agricultural loans
wererenewed rather than repaid at the normal maturity date in these
three respective periods?
THIS YEAR: Z
3 YRS AGO: Z
5 YRS AGO: Z
34. In terms of dollar volume , what percentage of agricultural loans
are currently involved in the FmHA loan guarantee program?
z
Do you expect this percentage to increase in the near future?
YES NO
In terms of dollar volume , what percentage of agricultural loans are
currently involved in the FmHA debt restructuring program?
Z
35. Is your institution WILLING to sell farm loans in a secondary mar-
ket? YES NO
Is your institution ABLE to sell farm loans in a secondary market?
YES NO
If you answered either question "NO," check all factors that are re-
sponsible.
Lack of officer familiarity with secondary loan market
Lack of demand for farm loans in secondary market
_
Cannot arrive at mutually beneficial price with buyer
Excessive paperwork and other complications
Other:
Other: z
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YODR COOPERATION IN COMPLETING THIS SURVEY.
IF YOU WOULD LIKE A SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY RESULTS, PLEASE ATTACH A
BUSINESS CARD HERE. YOU WILL THEN RECEIVE A SUMMARY REPORT WHEN THE
RESULTS ARE COMPILED.
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The business environment has changed noticeably for Kansas
banks in the 1980's. Events such as farm recession, greater vol-
atility of interest rates, and deregulation have produced a risk-
ier banking environment. This study examined which risks bankers
perceive as most important, why these perceptions are held, how
bankers measure risk exposure, and how bankers respond to these
risks .
Credit risk was perceived as the most important risk to Kan-
sas bankers today. Deteriorating credit conditions, particularly
in agriculture, have reduced loan portfolio quality for many
banks. Cost of funds risk is also perceived as quite important.
Regulatory risk has grown significantly in importance in the last
few years. Bank performance as measured by overall CAMEL rating
deteriorated from 1980 to 1985; this is an indication of the in-
creasing riskiness of the banking environmmen t . Bankers identi-
fied credit risk as the most important source of changes in bank
performance
.
The most significant change in risk measurement in the five-
year period was seen in cost of funds risk measurement, as
spreads and gaps became more important. Banks with lower CAMEL
ratings tended to have narrower preferences among measures of
risk, indicating that risk measurement may be best accomplished
through the use of multiple measures for each risk.
Management of cost of funds risk has seen increasing use of
spreads, gaps, and variable rate loans. Responses to agricul-
tural credit risk have included greater financial informational
demand from borrowers and higher collateral or security require-
ments for agricultural loans. Practices such as reviews of
lending policies, staffing needs, and bank goals and objectives
have become more common.
Performance has differed among certain groups of banks. In
general, agricultural banks were rated significantly below non-
agricultural banks today on overall CAMEL ratings. The very
largest Kansas banks have typically maintained stronger perform-
ance; however, they also appear to have experienced more risk in
their operations. Competent risk management may be necessary for
all Kansas banks to deal with the more risky banking enviroment.
